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The conflict in Northern Ireland has understandably been the 
focus of considerable attention since the eruption of violence in 
1969. Much has been made by journalists of religious influences 
upon politics in the province. On the other hand, academics have 
tended to dismiss this analysis by describing religion as merely the 
"shibboleth of the contending parties", or simply as "a manifestation 
of the divisions in Ireland, land] not its cause."1 Thus, the religious 
views of the different communities in Northern Ireland have not 
received the large amount of attention that has been given to other 
aspects of the confl ict. While the struggle has been roundly 
condemned In various ways as "a seventeenth-century religious 
war," very few researchers have given proper consideration to both 
the religious views of the different communities or to the way 
religious organizations contribute to the intransigence of the conflict.2 
While I agree with assertions that religion is not the single most 
important cause of the I rish "Troubles", I do believe that religion has 
a competing claim to be one of the major factors contributing to the 
intractabil ity of the situat ion. There arc a number of reasons behind 
th is. 
The groups at conflict arc commonly distinguished as either 
"Protestant" or "Catholic." This is not a journalistic invention; it is the 
term preferred by the residents of the province when asked to 
identify themselves I in a neutral setting, of course].3 Likewise, the 
sociologists Cairns and Waddell have found that: 
In Northern Ireland there are in a sense two competing 
ethnopolitical identities, Irish and I3ritish, which are 
underpinned, to a large extent, by the Catholic and Prot-
estant religions respectively.4 
By establishing the link between nationality and religion, they 
have recognized how political icIentification can be dependent upon 
faith in Northern Ireland. While critics would be quick to point out 
that religious identification in Ireland cIoes not always imply an 
active faith, I would counter with the argument that, in a region 
where approximately 70% of the population claims regular church 
attendance, religious beliefs lllUSt contribute to the formulation of at 
least some of the believer's political attitudes. 5 Brooke, in writing 
about Ulster Presbyterianislll, points out the fact that the rejection of 
religion as a political identification is a creation of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries; thus, one should be wary applying these 
relatively recent values to a four century old conflict. 6 He says 
almost indignantly that: 
... religion is a crucial clement in the formation of 
1 
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national identity ... We still hear complaints that there 
is a conflict in Northern Ireland between "Protestants" 
and "Catholics" from those who would see nothing untoward 
in conflicts between "French" and "Germans" ... Being French 
or German is as much a mailer of 'mere' opinion as being 
Protestant or Catholic, and the history of religion is largely 
the history of the process by which such 'mere opinions' 
were formed. 7 
Another reason that feel that understanding the religious 
views of the conflicting groups in Northern Ireland is important is 
because religion has been a divisive issue in Irish politics not only in 
the dim past but well into the twentieth century, and even to the 
present day. For example, by the early 1930s, when Northern 
Ireland Parliament at Stormont had been established as a Unionist 
domain, Prime Minister William Craig, later Lord Craigavon, spoke of 
his motives and objectives: 
I have always said that am an Orangeman first and 
a politician afterwards; all I boast is that we are a 
Protestant Parliament for a Protestant sLate. R 
In reply, Irish revol u tionary leader Eamonn de Valera, who 
headed the Irish Free State and the Irish Republic as either 
Taioseach [Prime Minister\ or President for 50 years, replied more 
formally yet no less definitively that "Ireland remains a Catholic 
nation. "9 
This adherence to the dominant religion in each part of the 
island is hardly empty rhetoric. The BllJlreac!zt n([ !zEireann, or the 
Irish Constitution of 1937, states that the Irish Roman Catholic 
church, though not the state church, would enjoy special status as the 
church of the bulk of the population of the twenty-six counties.! 0 
The idea of religion being a crucial part of one's political allegiance 
has been used by some of Ireland's foremost politicians; it also is 
viewed in this way by many of the less exalted residents of the 
province. For example, an anecdote was told to me by the Member 
of Parliament (MP) for South Belfast, the Reverend Martin Smyth. It 
also illustrates how religion is viewed by at least some of those in the 
thick of the conflict in Northern Ireland: 
I was in the streeL with this crowd of rioters-this was in 
the '69 riots-trying to pacify them. The drink was begin-
ning to wear off, and they were beginning to recognize 
me as well. This fellow said, "I've no time for your Jesus!" 
I said to him,"Why, what are you'?" 
lie says,"I'm an agnostic." 
I looked at the other ones and I said,"Did you hear 
that fellows'? What this boy says? lIe's an agnostic!" 
IThey askedl"What's that, Mr. Smyth?" 
I said,"Well, an agnostic is a person who doesn't 
know what he believes," 
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The fellow realized he'd put his foot in, and he said, 
"But I'm a Protestant agnostic!" 
I said, "An agnostic is one who doesn't know what he 
believes." 
The fellows who were slaring al him said, "What are 
you doing here? This is a religiolls war!" 
The fellow cleared off real quickly then ... I I 
While the violence in Northern Ireland is not caused by a dispute 
over such religious concepts as infant baptism or the truth of the 
virgin birth, there is at least a prima facie case for studying the way 
religion influences political behavior in the six Ulster counties. 
The primary focus of this study will be upon the Protestants of 
Northern Ireland, and s p e c i f i c ~t11 y upon the den 0 in ina t ion a I 
differences within this community. Of the studies that focus 
primarily upon Ulster Protestants, many have discerned a trait that 
Dr. A.T.Q. Stewart among others has called a "siege mentality."12 For 
convenience as well as for clari ty, I shall use the synonymous term 
garrisonism". The use of this term conjures up several images that I 
believe accurately describe Unionist political behavior. Later I w111 
discuss more fully the sources of this siege mentality; here I shall 
content myself with a brief description of its characteristics. One of 
these images is of a defensive group of people who are assailed from 
a number of directions. Being on the defensive inherently implies 
feelings of insecurity; in this case, it is primarily an insecurity about 
the future of the province's link with Britain. "Garrisonism" also 
implies that there is a sense of being an outpost in a foreign land. 
Along these lines, the Ulster Protestants feel themselves to be an 
outpost of British culture on the overwhelmingly Gaelic, Roman 
Catholic island of Ireland. 13 These differences have prompted one 
Ulster Unionist to write: 
The (Irish Republic's) claim (to Northern Ireland) is 
billerly resented by the Unionists because Unionists 
sec the Irish Republic as differing fundamentally in 
ethos from the United Kingdom, and this ethos Unionists 
do not share.' 4 
The fact that Northern Ireland is a separate state from the Republic 
of Ireland means that part of this difference in "ethos," like a 
garrison, is that there is also a clearly defined territory to be 
defended as "British" from those who would make it "Irish". Of 
course, geographically speaking, there is no hasis for the entire island 
not to be called Irish; the political horder, however, is of interest in 
this case. 
Being part of a garrison also implies that there are clear choices 
when deciding whether to be part of the British or the Irish cultures, 
as if it were a matter of opening a gate and crossing over to the other 
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side. For a considerable number of Ulster Protestants, the issues do 
seem clear-cut: "Ulster is British," as countless wall slogans attest, 
and there will be "No Surrender" to the Irish. Those who share these 
feelings either in spirit or out of acquiescence are wise to keep less 
stringent views to themselves, for political figures who have spoken 
out against these concepts even modestly (such as Terence O'Neill or 
Brian Faulkner) were branded "Lundies," or traitors, who would have 
opened the gates to the other side-in this case, the Catholic 
community. Indeed, the Ulster-Irish colloquialism "Lundy" 
illustrates this point. In 1688, the Lord Mayor of Londonderry, 
Robert Lundy, sought to surrender to the advancing armies of 
Catholic King James II rather than endure a siege of the city. Fearing 
tales of Catholic atrocities, a group or young apprentices closed the 
gates. This act is celebrated every year by a Protestant organization 
called the Apprentice Boys, who also burn the "traitorous" Lundy in 
effigy in front of large crowds of Ulster Protestants. The literality of 
the term garrisonism can be seen in the closing of the gates, and I 
contend that the annual reenactment is a symbolic recommitment to 
close the gates against future threats.! 5 
There are a number of sources of this garrisonism of the Ulster 
Protestant communi ty. One area of gaffi son i sm concern sits 
relationship with mainland Britain. The difficulties Northern Ireland 
has caused successive British governments are no secret, and neither 
are the strong feelings amongst some in Britain who would prefer to 
be rid of the province. For example, when the Ulster Unionist Party 
sponsored a candidate in the 1985 London-Fulham by-election, he 
received less than 100 votes. This prompted one researcher to 
comment that: 
While reliant upon Rritish support, Ulster Pro-
testants know well enough that, given the pre-
vailing costs, at the end or the day the British 
people do not want them.! 6., 
Some reasons for this lack of sympathy should be fairly 
obvious. Northern Ireland costs Britain approximately .£. 5.4 million 
per day, so it seems to many a financial drain on the British 
economy.!7 Killings and bombings on the British mainland make the 
conflict uncomfortably real to many residents. In direct contrast to 
the reality of violence is the obscurity of the motives behind it, for 
the political cleavages in Britain are oriented differently from those 
inN orthern I rei and. For example, the Conservati ve and Labour 
Parties that contest general elections in England, Scotland, and Wales 
are virtually non-existent in the north of Ireland. Deeper than this 
superficial pol itical di vergence I ies a more fundamental dichotomy of 
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concepts. David Miller, a historian, describes the political aspects of 
Protestant garrisonism towards Britain: 
The dilemma of the Ulster Protestant community derived 
from their conception of both their political obligation 
and their rights of citizenship in contractual terms. 
Lacking a genuine feeling of co-nationality with the 
British people, they could not entrust their fate to "safe-
guards" which depended upon the willingness of that 
people to intervene in Irish affairs to rectify abuses. 
Just as the guarantee of Ulster Protestant allegiance 
was their own fidelity to the contract of government, 
so the guarantee of their rights ... was the reciprocal 
faithfulness of the sovereign authority. But the sov-
ereign authority was effectively no longer a single 
person, the monarch, but a parliament responsible to 
the people. The people are fickle, and it is a fundamental 
feature of the British constitution that Parliament is 
incapable of giving binding promises; any law enacted 
by one Parliament can be repealed by the next. That 
constitutional system simply lacks a concept of entrenched 
rights heyond the reach of the clirrent Commons majority.! 8 
Thus, a concrete constitutional reason lies beneath the feelings 
of insecurity held by many Ulster Protestants concerning their 
relationship with Britain. The way the Protestants cling so fervently 
to the link with Britain is, again, similar to that of an outpost that 
fears being abandoned by the mother country to fend for itself. 
Evidence for this also comes from the conspicuous absence of a 
strong Ulster independence movement.!9 Though the Ulster 
Protestants have a strong regional identity that allows them to feel 
fundamentall y different from the den izen s of ei ther Engl and, 
Scotland, or Wales, and even though there is evidence that they feel 
less in common with their geographically closer neighbors to the 
south than with their co-nationals in Britain, the Protestants have 
been reluctant to call for indepencience. 2o Of the varied reasons for 
this, the economic situation of the province along with the small size 
of Northern Ireland seem to be the strongest motivations for this 
failure to actively seek autonomy. 
Other sources of garrisonism lie in the past. As many have 
noted, references to history tend to crop up with amazing frequency 
in Irish political affairs. A.T.O. Stewart writes that "Ireland, like 
Dracula's Transylvania, is much troubled by the undead."2! In a 
more serious vein, he develops the idea of the past asserting itself 
into today's affairs in Ireland. In doing so, he speaks of how past 
experiences of the Protestant community has produced these feelings 
of garflsomsm: 
The planters were frontiersmen, and naturally dis-
played frontier attitlldes where their lands bordered 
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on those of the native septs ... (They) developed over 
a long time a special kind of siege mentality created 
by the necessity of having always to test the loyalty 
of those within the settlement itself, both the "Irish" 
settled in pockets within the frontier and those whose 
steadfastness might have been undermined by constant 
day to day contact with them, as a countercheck to inevitable 
hibernicization. . .From the outset they faced the menace 
of a fifth column. This was and still is the essence of what 
is called the Ulster problem.22 
Thus Stewart describes two focal points of Protestant garrisonism, 
namely fear of the "native" Irish population (meaning here the 
Roman Catholic citizens of both the Irish Republic and of Northern 
Ireland), and fear of those within the Protestant ranks who would 
compromise with these "natives"-the "fifth column" of Lundies. 
Strictly speaking, it is improper to speak of the differences between 
the Protestants and Catholics In Ireland as a problem between 
"settler" and "nati ve." The PI antat ion of Ulster, a large-scale 
"homestead" plan which granted large tracts of Irish lands to 
Protestant settlers from Britain, occurred in 1007, and immigration 
from Scotland had undoubtedly gone on for centuries before that. 
However, the Plantation was distinct from previous types of 
settlement because it did not result In a mixing of the British and 
Irish. Though previous immigrants to the isle had been accused of 
being "More Irish than the Irish", the Plantation of Ulster caused 
bitterness between the settlers and the natives that led to the 
garrisonism of today. For example, Long noted this continuing 
separation of the two communities: 
While there has been considerable intermarriage 
over the centuries. . .there has been no integration 
of the Protestant and Catholic communities) 3 
Thus, divisions between the two groups have remained to the 
present era. Bearing this in mind, it is possible to find, as Stewart 
did, correlations between settlers looking for signs of compromising 
behavior in their neighbors which might lead to dire consequences 
and present-day voters who fear a modern compromIse having 
similar adverse results. 
My primary focus is upon the garrisonism that is directed 
within the Ulster Protestant community itself. Tension seems to 
arise primarily between the Presbyterian churches and the Church of 
Ireland, and of course, these frictions come from a number of 
reasons. In a nutshell, though, I believe the essence of their quarrel 
is that reI i giously fund amen tal i st, work i ng -cl ass to lower-middle 
class Presbyterians fear "Lundies" coming from within the ranks of 
the religiously liberal, financially better-off Church of Ireland. This 
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concept has been propounded by both the historian Stewart and the 
sociologist Nelson, and may also be inferred from information 
collected by Moxon-Browne. 24 
As it appears, this is an extremely broad generalization that 
requires further explanation. first I want to assert that these 
differences are subordinate to the other two areas of garrisonism 
that are directed outside the Protestant community towards Irish 
Catholics and mainland Britons. The overwhelming majority of Ulster 
Protestants, regardless of their denomination, support the 
continuance of the link with Britain. As has been noted by numerous 
observers, the Ulster Protestant community tends to close ranks 
when presented with a crisis that threatens this link. HClwever, I 
believe that this characteristic has been over-emphasized. The 
Unionist community has too often been portrayed as a monolithic 
group of people with identical goal s and bel iefs which results in an 
almost telepathic consensus about political questions. This view is 
far too simplistic. As I have stated, the Ulster Unionist community 
has internal frictions that exacerbate existing fears about their 
present pol itical sit uation. The same logic beh ind the American 
phrase "United we stand, but divided we fall" has prevailed in times 
of crisis for the Ulster Unionists. Despite the fact that these internal 
insecurities are secondary, they exist within the Ulster Protestant 
community and have implications for Protestant political behavior. 
By high- lighting these differences, I hope to draw attention to an 
aspect of Protestant politics that previously has not received proper 
academic attention. However, I am definitely not implying that it is 
the most important political cleavage in Northern Ireland. 
Also, it should be fairly predictable that Irish Presbyterians are 
not exclusively working and lower middle-class, nor are the 
members of the Church of Ireland all middle and upper-class. 
However, the Presbyterian church~.s .. do have proportionately more 
working-class than the Church of Ireland, and likewise the Church of 
Ireland has proportionately more upper-class believers than the 
Presbyterians. These characteristics have noticeable political 
ramificat ions-Pres byteri an s tend to gra v i tate toward s the more 
openly intransigent, anti-establishment Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) while members of the Church of Ireland tend to belong to the 
less extreme Official Unionist Party (OUP), or to the only political 
party in Northern Ireland without a preponderance of members from 






















% of % of % of 
OUP Alliance pop. 
44.7 23.3 19 
34.5 22.8 23 
1.1 0.0 2 
l.8 5.2 4 
0.8 0.5 
0.0 44.0 28 
15.3 4.1 26 
*includes those who declined to state a religious preference 
As these loyalties may be partially explained in economic 
terms, they also seem to be a political manifestation of the religious 
differences between the Presbyterians and the Church of Ireland. In 
the course of this project, I plan to demonstrate how the 
fundamentalist, uncomprOmISIng theology of the Presbyterian 
churches makes rigid and uncompromising political behavior more 
acceptable to many Ulster Protestants, and, indeed, the above 
statistics seem to hear this out. Conversely, the more theologically 
liberal views of the Church of Ireland about religious differences 
translates into more liheral attitudes towards compromise on 
political differences. Thus, those who oppose religious and political 
compromise are distrustful of those who are more inclined to bend-
and thus is born the fear of "Lundies". 
Finally, I should explain why I have chosen to not examIne 
other Protestant denominations in the province such as the 
Methodists or the Baptists. Numerically, these groups are tiny 
fractions of the Protestant population of the province, and thus 
statistically are not the major blocks of the Northern Irish electorate 
that are formed by the Presbyterians and the Church of Ireland. 
Strength of Protestant Denom·in-ations in N. Ireland 26 











While not discounting the attitudes of these groups, it seems more 
fruitful to explore the differences between the main Protestant 
denominations. 
What are the results of this Ulster Protestant garrisonism? One 
obvious ramification IS that it stands directly In the way of 
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consensual progress towards a peaceful resol ution of the massive 
problems that engulf Northern Ireland. Of course, there are a mind-
boggling number of factors that seem to interact almost in Brownian 
motion that also stand in the way of "resolving" the situation. Thus, 
Ulster Protestant garrisonism is both a cause of these factors and an 
effect of them. For example, by clinging so reflexively to the link 
with Britain, the Unionists are effectively standing in the way of any 
progress towards a solution to the conflict. Conversely, they cling to 
the union so tightly precisely because virtually all of the proposed 
solutions seem to involve its ultimate abolition. 
Thus, the specter of Irish annexation combined with the ever-
present possibility of British infidelity makes a solid, united Unionist 
front an imperative for the continued existence of Northern Ireland. 
However, more extreme loyalists, contained primarily within the 
ranks of the Presbyterian churches, tend to question the resolve of 
those more inclined to compromise, who seem most likely to appear 
in the Church of Ireland. This distrust leads to greater insecurity 
within Unionist ranks and thus to increased garrisonism, for not only 
must the more vehement Unionists be wary of the maneuverings of 
the Irish Republic and the intentions of the British mainland, but 
they also must watch for those Lundies within their own ranks who 
would leave the gates open to compromise over Northern Ireland's 
ultimate constitutional status. This means that virtually any 
compromise or attempt to establish working dialogues between the 
two communities is fiercely resisted by a considerable portion of the 
Protestant community and viewed as the proverbial "foot In the 
door." This resistance would assuredly include members from all the 
main Protestant denominations, but I would contend that it would 
have a higher proportion from the Presbyterian community than 
those from the Church of Ireland. Developing this concept will be a 
major part of this paper, but it is. !1()t the sole purpose. I also feel 
that a concise history of Ulster Unionism, along with a brief 
examination of the relevant characteristics of the parties that attract 
more than negligible support in the Unionist community (Le., the 
DUP, the OUP, and the Alliance Party) will be helpful. Also, the 
interesting case of the Reverend Ian Paisley (a Free Presbyterian 
minister) provides an example of a paragon of Ulster garrisonism 
who is additionally the most popular political figure in the province. 
An examination of how his theology influences his political beliefs is 
helpful as a case study of a figure that embodies the fear of 
Catholicism, the distrust of Britain, and the ever-present search for 
Lundies that pervades so much of Ulster Unionism. Also, a study of 
the ecumenical movement In Northern Ireland, along with its 
9 
conspicuous sluggishness, helps show the dividing Jines within the 
Protestant community between Anglican and Presbyterian. 
In concl usion, I want to point out that many of these theories 
have been developed from personal examination of the province, and 
thus I have been forced to assemble from diverse sources the 
documentation for this theory, sometimes at great distances. To my 
knowledge, the book about this aspect of Northern Irish Protestant 
political behavior has yet to be written. Thus, there will be areas 
that are less-fully documented than I would prefer, and there will be 
times that the conclusions drawn seem controversial. I again want to 
emphasize that my purpose in preparing this project is to shed light 
on a relatively unexplored area of Irish politics, and my :lim is to 
bring interesting facts and possible conclusions to the attention of 
those who might otherwise overlook them. 
ISlewart,The Narrow Ground,p.180; Bell, Protestants of Ulster, p.13. 
2BeII ,Protestants of Ulster, p.12. 
3Cairns and Merccr,"Social Identity in NOrlhern Ireland",Human 
Relations,37,no. 12,p.ll00. 
4Waddell and Cairns,"Situational Perspcclives on Social Identity in Northern 
Ireland" ,British Journal oj Social Psychology,25 , 1980,p.25-0. 
5Moxon -Browne ,Nation, Class, and Crad in N()rthcrn Ireland,p .89. 
6Brookc,Ulster Preshytcrians,p.20 I. 
7lbid. ,po ix-x. 
8Quoted in Bcll,Protcstants of Ulster,pAO 
9Quoled in Becketl, J.e., in The Constitution of Northern Ireiand:Problems and 
Perspectives. 
10Arlicle 44, as quoted in Chubb, Government in Ireland,p.o8. 
II Rev. Martin Smyth, interview with author, 17 July 1989. 
12Slewarl, the Narrow Ground,pAS. 
13Bruce,God Save Ulster!,p.124. 
14S m ilh,Why Unionists Say No,p.3-4. 
15 Slewart, The Narrow Grollnd,p.o7. 
16Wallis,el.al."Elhnicity and Evangelism:lan Paisley and Protestant Politics in 
Ulster", Comparative Studies of Society and f1istory,29 ,Apr.1987 ,p.302. 
17David McKittrick,The I nciependent, 12 August 1989,p.l0. 
18Miller, Queen's Rebels,p. 103. 
19Nelson,Ulster's Uncertain Defenders,p. 12-13. 
20lbid.,p. 12-13. 
21 Stewart,The N(lrr{l'v (' I , 1 c: , ./ro if/( ,po oj. 
22lbid.,pA 7. 
21].ong, Orilflgcism il/ Cal/ai/a,p. ix. 
24Stcwart,Narrow Cro/il/d.p.1 ():'-3. 
1 0 
25Moxon-Browne.Nation.Class. and Creed in Northern Ireland.p. 66. 84. 89. 96. 
Northern Ireland Censlls 1981. HMSO. p. 50. Percentages in OUP had to be 
interpolated from data on the above pages. 
26Ibid.,p.89. 
1 1 
HISTOI{Y OF lJLSTER lJNIONISM 
In the previous chapter, some basic observations about the 
political behavior of the Ulster Protestants were made and a few 
conclusions drawn. One is that the Protestants of Northern Ireland 
behave politically in a manner I feel is best described by the term 
"garrisonism". That is, they are extremely defensive about their 
constitutional status as a part of the United Kingdom. A second is 
that within this Protestant community, there are internal frictions 
that occur primarily along denominational lines, although economic 
and social differences accompany these religious demarcations 
between the major denominations of the Church of Ireland and the 
Presbyterian churches. Third, these frictions inside the Protestant 
community, though often overshadowed by externally directed 
conflicts (such as those with the Roman Catholic community), 
heighten the sense of garrisonism amongst many in the Protestant 
community by destabilizing the oft-observed "solidity" of the Ulster 
Protestants in defending the link with Britain. In order to better 
understand the first observation concerning the garrisonistic 
behavior of Ulster Protestants both today and in the past, it is 
necessary to examine the history of Ulster unionism. In the process, 
basic knowledge about the Unionist community may be gained that is 
crucial to later assessment of the validity of the second and third 
observation s. 
The present deployment of Unionist political forces can be 
traced back to a little over one hundred years ago with the rise of 
the Irish Home Rule movement. The Liberal Prime Minister William 
Gladstone made Irish causes a cornerstone of his 1885 manifesto, 
and giving the Irish their own parliament \Vas a fundamental goal. 
While warmly welcomed by much of the Irish population, the 
prospect of Home Rule aroused dark fears in many Irish Protestants. 
Since the overwhelming majority of Ireland's Protestants lived in the 
nine Ulster counties,l the hotbed of opposition to the home rule 
movement lay in the northern province. In 1885, Ulster citizens 
concerned about the prospect of home rule hastily organized to 
muster their opposition to Home Rule. Because the crisis had caught 
many Protestants off-guard, no formal machinery existed to facilitate 
political activity. As a result, the framework of the Orange Order, a 
fraternal lodge dedicated to the agressive and provocative assertion 
of Protestantism, was used as an organizational basis. 2 The Order 
was also a major vehicle for the formation of the Ulster Unionist 
Council(UUC), in 1886. These two facts help show that Unionism was 
from the heginning almost exclusively a Protestant movement. Like 
1 2 
the Order, Ulster Unionism had a distinct democratic flavor that was 
notable for a time well before universal suffrage had appeared in the 
United Kingdom. Chronicler of the Ulster Unionist Party John 
Harbinson has written that: 
... the Ulster Unionist Council developed as an 
umbrella under which Unionists of all classes 
and depth of conviction took shelter from the 
chill wind of anti-partitionisl11. . .the funda-
mental exercise of maintaining Protestant 
power, and hence the union, was best achieved 
by this loose federal structure) 
He has also drawn attention to one of the major factors motivating 
Protestants to oppose dismantling of the constitutional link with 
Britain--they saw it as detrimental to their political and economic 
interests. Particularly at the end of the nineteenth century, Irish 
Protestants were on the top of the island's socio-economic ladder. 4 
Because they benefitted from the union in a number of ways, they 
sought to maintain it. It should not be construed that all Protestants 
were wealthy or even well off. Still, being a Protestant in Ireland at 
this time meant for many the benefits of being in a special category. 
Historian David Miller has written that in nineteenth-century 
Ireland: 
Social change might put one's class in jeopardy 
but one could never lose the status which 
attached to being a Protestant, except by some 
unthinkable act, such as marrying a Catholic. 
In many situation his essence was still his 
social position,i.e., his Protestantism.s 
Thus, it seems that what loss of the Union meant socially and 
economically to the bulk of the Irish population in 1885 was that 
Protestant privileged status would be suppressed by the 90% Roman 
Catholic population of the island. While this was unsurprisingly 
welcomed by Irish Catholics, it was also resisted by Ulster 
Protestants. Religious fears also phl'yed a significant role in this early 
Protestant opposition to Home Rule. The rhetorical phrase that 
enjoyed considerable popular currency in both islands at the time 
was that "Home Rule means Rome Rule," referring not only to the 
strong ultramontanist characteristics of the Irish Roman Catholic 
Church hierarchy, but also to the high level of political control at 
even the parish level. 6 This, combined with the strongly anti-
Protestant stance of the Vatican at the turn of the century, led many 
Ulster Protestants to the conclusion that they might not only lose 
their socio-pol i tical hegemony, but might even lose their "right" to be 
Protestant. 7 It was assumed that the elimination of divorce and 
other restrictions would be incorporated into any government that 
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depended solely upon support from the Catholic population of the 
island, and this would suppress Protestant freedoms, perhaps even 
those of the freedom to worship. As one woman reminisced about 
the Home Rule issue, she described a song that her father had taught 
her: 
Sir Edward Carson had a cat 
that sat upon a fender, 
And every time it caught a mouse 
it shouted 'No Surrender!,g 
She went on to state that, "There was never any doubt in my mind 
that the surrender dreaded was to the powers of Rome." 9 While this 
Protestant/Catholic dichotomy is often cited, less noted has been the 
historical animosity between the Anglican Church of Ireland and the 
more fundamentalist Presbyterians. When presented the possibility 
of both Protestant faiths heing miniscule minorities in a Catholic 
Ireland, however, old wounds healed rather quickly. As Brooke, a 
historian of Ulster Presbyterianism has written: 
The Unionist Party was, of course, a mass-based party 
which fulfiIIed at least one of the historical purposes 
of the British political parties~to override religious 
differences(in this case, as principally in the British 
parties, the differences among Protestants) in favour 
of a great national secular cause. lO 
The secular cause was, of course, to defeat Home Rule. Though 
united in times of crisis, the Anglican/Presbyterian split did not 
disappear; it was only made less apparent in light of a greater crisis. 
In these early days of Unionism can be found the same reasons 
given today hy Ulster Unionists for their rigid, unyielding 
commitment to the Act of Union. rear of a loss of their favoured 
socio-economic status combined with religious opposition to Roman 
Catholicism made the majority of Ulster Protestants side with the 
Conservative and Liheral Unionists in Britain to defeat the first Home 
Rule Bill in 1886. 
The Second I-lome Rule Bill of 1893 seems in retrospect to have 
been doomed to failure. The same coalition of parliamentarians that 
had combined to defeat the bill seven years before regrouped and 
were again victorious despite the fact that the Ulster Unionist Council 
had further strengthened its organizational framework. Some 
researchers have discerned a decided regional autonomy developing 
about this time in the relations of the Ulster Unionists with their 
fellow Unionists to the south. ll Though the thought of home rule for 
only part of Ireland (i.e., partition) was far from a topic of open 
discussion in orthodox Unionist circles at this time, one can see the 
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beginnings of a subtle shift of the focus of Ulster Unionist 
deliberations to their own backyards. 
After the turn of the century, a string of Liberal successes 
under the stewardship of Herbert Henry Asquith brought Irish Home 
Rule back into the political limelight. As Home Rule began to seem 
more and more of an inevitability, Ulster Unionists began to talk of a 
separate dispensation from the rest of Ireland. Here is where 
partition was born. Possibilities of nine-county, six-county, and even 
four-county exclusion (Londonderry, Antrim, Down, and Armagh) 
were bandied about for some time. Though the Unionist leader, 
Dubliner Sir Edward Carson, was opposed to any partition, the Ulster 
Unionists began to seriously search for any possible way to opt out of 
Home Rule. Partition seemed the only means of doing this, and six-
county partition in particular seemed the best way to insure Unionist 
hegemony in the years to come, for the high percentage of Roman 
Catholics in the three western Ulster counties of Donegal, Cavan, and 
Monaghan would make Protestant electoral majorities much less 
certain. 12 
After the Parliament Act of 1911 significantly reduced the 
powers of the overwhelmingly Conservative and Unionist House of 
Lords by removing their powers of veto, nothing seemed to stand in 
the way of the combined forces of the Liberal Party and the Irish 
"Home Rulers," often inaccurately dubbed the Irish Parliamentary 
Party, of bringing home rule to the island of Ireland. 13 Committed to 
their opposition of Home Rule, the Ulster Unionist Council made use 
of an obscure constitutional clause to form the Ulster Volunteer 
Force(UVF). Not to be confused with today's urban paramilitary 
group of the same ti tIe, the UVF of 1912 was a province-wide 
organization that was committed to "defending the constitution of the 
United Kingdom as it now stands".14 Though in the early days they 
trained with wooden guns to th.~. mirth of many Home Rulers, 
matters took a serious turn when the Larne gun-runnings of early 
1914 brought thousands of German rifles to the UVF. In that year, 
the delaying powers of the House of Lords expired, and the 
enactment of the Third Home Rule Bill seemed certain. Thus, in the 
name of King and Country, Ulster Unionists ironically stood ready to 
rebel. 
It is perhaps prudent to examine this paradoxical stand by the 
Ulster Unionists, for it is typical of attitudes today that lead 
observers to dub them the "voice of illogicality" .15 While claiming to 
be "Loyalists," the Ulster Protestants, either through acquiescence or 
active support, were behaving in a positively mutinous manner. 
Thus it seems that Unionists were in the perplexing situation of being 
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ready to rebel in order to remain loyal to Britain. At the heart of this 
confusing situation is what Miller has identified as a contractarian 
view of politics. lIe points out that: 
Loyalty is quite different from nationality ... The 
Ulster Protestants are Irishmen, Ulstermen, and 
British at the same time. By remaining loyal to 
the crown (and not necessari Iy the Crown in 
Parliament) they are being honest, faithful to 
a contract entered into hundreds of years ago. l6 
The contract he refers to is the agreement of the late seventeenth 
century between King William III (of England) and the Protestants of 
the realm that they would remain loyal as long as the monarch was a 
Protestant. Miller points out a crucial factor: Ulster Protestants are 
loyal not to the prevailing elected Government at Westminster but to 
the constitutional source of all authority in British politics, namely 
the reigning monarch. This leads to serious misunderstandings, 
particularly when, as in 1912, Unionists and the Government in 
Westminster are at loggerheads as to which course to take. For 
example, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees 
bitterly complained of the Unionists that, "Loyalty to the UK was 
supposed to be their creed but only as long as it suited them."17 
Perhaps a more understanding view was voiced by Nelson: 
If (Protestants) acknowledged loyalty it was as 
something reciprocal. To propose [mutiny] ... 
was not disloyal if Britain had already shown 
disloyalty to Ulster Protestants.! H 
Thus, it must be remembered that there is a complicated logic behind 
such an apparent paradox as Ulster Unionists rebelling to remaIn 
loyal. 
At about the time it seemed certain that the Ulster Unionists 
were preparing to fight the Irish Nationalists who were also arming, 
the First World War provided a foreign outlet for tensions in the 
British Isles. While it possibly helped defuse a civil war in Britain 
itself, political violence became a reality in Ireland with the 1916 
Easter Rising in Dublin. Though the surviving participants of the 
rising were spit upon by the populace of Dublin as they were led 
through the streets, the harsh British reaction that culminated in the 
execution of such men as Patrick Pearse and James Connolly turned 
renegades into martyrs. The simmering trouble in Ireland erupted 
with a vengeance in the fall of 1918. Sinn Fein, which won every 
seat outside Ulster with the exception or the four Trinity College-
Dublin seats, established the DaiL Eirc([llll, or Irish Parliament, in 
Dublin after the December elections. The heavy-handed attempts of 
the British government to restore order led to even fiercer resistance 
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in the three southern provinces of Connacht, Munster, and Leinster. 
Faced by such an unstable situation, the Coalition Government under 
Lloyd-George passed the Government of Ireland Act (1920) that 
called for the establishment of two separate parliaments in Belfast 
and Dublin that were still tied to the United Kingdom. The 
Republican forces did not accept the compromise attempt. The 
violence in Ireland continued, and public outcry in Britain forced 
Lloyd-George to negotiate a treaty that left virtually no one 
satisfied .19 As civil war flared up in the new twenty-six county 
Irish Free State about whether to accept partItIOn of Ireland, 
sectarian violence spread throughout Northern Ireland. The 
Northern Irish Parliament at Stormont (a district in south Belfast) 
was established along the lines called for in the Government of 
Ireland Act (1920). Thus, the "Protestant parliament for a Protestant 
people" (though Northern Ireland was at this time almost one-third 
Roman Catholic) was established in an atmosphere of sectarian 
violence and civil war. These extreme conditions were to manifest 
themselves in the political hehavior of Stormont Unionist 
parliamentarians for the next fifty years. 
The new Northern Irish Parliament was not independent; it 
was an experiment in "devolved government," with ultimate power 
residing in Westminster, particularly in such areas as revenue 
disbursement. In practice, however, the House of Commons paid 
little attention to the operation of the Stormont parliament, and 
allowed the Ulster Unionists virtual autonomy. Nelson has discerned 
a numher of traits that marked the years of Unionist dominance 
(1921-1972): one, that democracy to many in the Northern Irish 
state meant majority rule was absolute; two, constitutional issues 
(i.e., whether Northern Ireland would continue to exist as part of the 
UK or not) were crucial, and all other matters (such as socio-economic 
reform) were secondary; three, as a _.:result of this, politics came to be 
viewed as a zero-sum game where someone's gain implied someone 
else's loss; four, the predictability of political outcomes in the 
province meant that there were shared expectations/frustrations on 
both sides; and five, that refusal to compromise quickly became "a 
sign of integrity. "20 
What this meant for politics in the province was that the 
"Unionists were the winners in 1920, they made the rules after that, 
and did their best to enforce them."21 The Unionists were guilty of 
gerrymandering, perhaps most notoriously in the case of the city of 
Derry/Londondcrry,22 and even the official chronicler of the UUC has 
admitted that some Party Secretaries "knew every trick that was in 
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the book, and some that were not" 10 order to assure Unionist 
electoral victories. 23 
It should be pointed out that as the immediacy of the Home 
Rule "threat" receded and became a memory, the Unionist Party, as it 
was now beginning to be called, began to show signs of 
fragmentation. Such a diverse coalition as the UUP had to have 
considerable political inertia to remain cohesive in calmer times, and 
from time to time there were challenges. Typical of these challenges 
was the Independent Unionist Party. Nelson has captured the 
paradoxical significance of the Independent Unionists: 
The Independent Unionist tradition is more signif-
icant than internal party divisions (in the Ulster 
Unionist Party 1920-19(9) ... It is not really social-
ist because its adherents have not shared conven-
tional socialist assumptions about class structure 
and class connie!. . .Nevertheless the Independent 
Unionist tradition sustained, and gave a focus for, 
Protestant working-class hostility to traditional 
(middle-class) leaders and policies--especially in 
certain areas of Belfast, like the Shankill."24 
While tangential to Ulster Unionism as a whole, the Independent 
Unionist tradition, along with other splinter Unionist groups such as 
the Progressive Unionists, betray the complex nature of Unionist 
politics-while undoubtedly united in support of the link with Britain, 
Ulster Unionism should not be considered single-minded to the 
exclusion of all else. Though geographically isolated, Northern 
Ireland does not live in isolation, and many of the same issues that 
cropped up in European politics caused tension at Stormont not just 
along the tradi tional cleavages of U nioni st/N ationalist but wi thin the 
major parties themselves. However, the continued dominance of the 
Ulster Unionist Party throughout these years testifies to the accuracy 
of Nelson's recognition of the primacy of constitutional issues in the 
politics of Northern Ireland from the_ 1920s until the 1960s, and for 
the majority of voters in Northern Ireland, up to the present-day. 
From the 1930s to the 1950s, these frictions were held in check 
through a near-autocratic party leadership that was also in direct 
contact with the sectarian attitudes of the grassroots of the party. 
Tensions quickly came to a head in the 1960s when the leadership 
began to attempt mild reforms. In 1963, Captain Terence O'Neill 
became leader of the Ulster Unionist Party and thus Prime Minister 
of Northern Ireland. I1is goal was to gradually change Northern Irish 
political life to more closely resemble that of the British mainland. 25 
He began to appear openly with stich ohviotlsly Roman Catholic 
figures as nuns and priests, which, \vhile hardly considered improper 
by the majority of Unionists, did raise some eyebrows. O'Neill caused 
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himself further trouble when he invited Irish Taioseach Sean Lemass 
to visit, thus breaking an unwritten rule of the Ulster Unionists that 
at least subtle hostility must be shown towards the Republic at all 
times to avoid any misconceptions about the weakening of Ulster 
Unionist resolve. It was at this time that Ian Paisley, ever on the 
extreme fringe of Protestant politics, hegan his famous chant of 
"O'Neill must go!" While at this time still in the decided minority, the 
numbers repeating this incantation began to grow because of a 
movement that was expanding independently of the traditional 
groups of Northern Irish political life. 
As in most of the western world, the 1960s brought unrest to 
Ulster. The foundations of it hegan innocuously enough in the form 
of a group inspired by the successes of Martin Luther King that 
sought to give greater civil rights to the Roman Catholic population of 
the province. The Civil Rights Movement sought to redress some of 
the glaring sectarianism of the Northern Irish police force, most 
notably in their demands for the disbandment of the "B Specials", a 
large group of Protestant pol ice reservists, as well as espousing such 
social goals as equality in public housing for Catholics and 
Protestants. It was from the beginning a predominantly Roman 
Catholic movement, and when they began to march through the 
streets demanding equal treatment, the old, predictable parameters 
of Stormont politics that Nelson described hegan to crumble. Here 
was a rapidly growing group for whom the old constitutional issues 
were not paramount. They were denyi ng the right of the majority to 
rule as it saw fit; indeed, they were forwarding the claim that had 
received only sporadic support in the 1920-1960 period that the 
majority not only ought to seek equality, but had a moral imperative 
to do so. In short, the Civil Rights Movement was a challenge to 
many of the postulates of Protestant politics of the previous forty 
years.26 
This challenge from outside the Unionist community was thus 
paralleled by new uncertainties within the Unionist leadership. Even 
the modest reforms and gestures of Terence O'Neill were too much 
for increasing numbers of Protestants. With every march, more 
Protestants began to feel threatened and the siege mentality 
reasserted itself. The numbers of Protestants clamoring for O'Neill's 
removal grew. In the fall of 1968, a civil rights march was stoned at 
Burntollet Bridge hy a Protestant mob under the eyes of the 
overwhelmingly Protestant Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). The old 
lines began to he drawn yet again, and soon there was no room for 
compromise in the Unionist ranks. In the spring of 1969, a rash of 
bomhings at power stations across the province provoked demands 
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for order that O'Neill could not provide. lIe resigned in the fall of 
1969, and shortly after his resignation, it became clear that it was 
the Protestant paramilitary group, the UYF, which had been 
nominally reformed In 1966, which was responsible for the 
bombings, and not the IRAJ7 The reasons one portion of the 
Unionist community would use such methods to depose a leader are 
fundamentally the same as those which led to the formation of the 
old UVF In 1912: loyalty is conditional, and if one contractor breaks 
the faith, as many felt O'Neill had done, it was indeed time for him to 
go, and, to some at least, any means of effecting this removal was 
justified. 
A succession of Unionist leaders followed, and none were able 
to quell the ever-increasing violence that raged from 1969, when 
British troops had been sent into the streets, to 1972. The Stormont 
government resorted to internment, a device used intermittently to 
detain without positive proof those people suspected of participating 
in republican actIvItIes. This time, they attempted wholesale 
internment that embittered the vast majority of the Roman Catholic 
community. The series of demonstrations continued, and on January 
30, 1972, a detachment of British paratroopers shot 13 protesters 
dead in what became known as "Bloody Sunday." As a result, 
Stormont's authority was revoked by the British government, and 
Westminster assumed direct rule of Northern Ireland. 
Unionism splintered into many different branches for the first 
time in its history. Arthur and Jeffery, in their capsule history of the 
recent conflict, have described the state of Unionist politics at this 
time: 
A consequence of this division was that it left the 
way open for someone or some party to exploit the 
divisions in unionism in an atlempt to claim leader-
ship of all unionists ... The intensity of this bailIe 
led to such acrimony and .exaggerated pledges that 
rational debate became impossible within the camp. 
As a result unionists tried to outbid each other in 
their claims to be the true loyalists. In tum, this 
induced unrealistic expectations of what they might 
secure from the government in terms of their pol-
itical future and it made them incapable of negotia-
ting a meaningful compromise with their political 
opponellts. 2R 
With the benefit of hindsight, it becomes clear that despite this 
multiple fragmentation of the unionists, there were still some clearly 
divisive issues between the Protestant and Roman Catholic 
commumtles, particularly in the 1973 General Election. In Northern 
Ireland, the main isslIe was whether the British governments plan 
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for "power-sharing" between Protestants and Catholics (the 
Sunningdale initiative) was to be put into force. Battle lines were 
drawn between the pro-Faulkner Unionists, who backed the titular 
head of the UUP, Brian Faulkner, in his approval of Sunningdale, and 
the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC), a coalition of the rest of 
the Unionists who opposed the plan. The main points of contention 
most Unionists had with Sunningdale were that it would give 
Northern Irish Catholics a numerically disproportionate voice in the 
governing of the province, and particularly that it called for the 
establishment of a Council of Ireland, that provided for 
representatives of both the northern and southern parliaments to 
meet to decide matters of common concern. To many Unionists, this 
seemed to be an acknowledgement by the Westminster government 
that the Republic of Ireland had a legitimate right to influence 
Northern Irish affairs. Thus, the "Irish Dimension," which seemed so 
logical to consensus oriented British politicians, was anathema to 
much of the Ulster Protestant population. The result of the election 
was a resounding "No" from the protestant population, for the uuue 
received 51 % of the total vote in the province, meaning that roughly 
80% of the Protestant community voted for the UUUC.2 9 
This blow to the legitimacy of Sunningdale was followed up by 
the 1974 Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) general strike. For ten days, 
Protestant workers in crucial industries (particularly those who 
manned the power stations) combined with strong-::umers in the 
Protestant paramilitary groups to virtually shut down Northern 
Ireland. Strategical and military concerns tied the hands of the 
Labour government, and the stipulations of Sunningdale were 
revoked. A notable point about this strike is that it defied common 
perceptions of what moti vates workers to a general strike. Rather 
than some orthodox Marxian expression of proletarian outrage, the 
UWC strike of 1974 was a conservative strike that was consciously 
organized to maintain the political status quo of direct rule from 
Britain. While many protestants saw direct rule as perhaps the 
"lesser of two evils", they preferred it to taking steps towards the 
loss of the constitutional link with Britain. This working-class 
political initiative was singular, and instead of heralding a "new age" 
of proletarian politics in Northern Ireland, it paved the way for a 
return to the old political struggle for the mantle of leadership of the 
Unionist party. In 1977, another strike was announced. However, it 
was a failure, and it also resulted in the hreakup of the UUUC. 
By the early 1980s there seemed to he two main contenders 
for the Unionist throne-the Official Unionist Party(OUP), direct 
descendant of the Ulster Unionist Party, headed hy the quiet James 
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Molyneaux, and the Democratic Unionist Party(DUP), which had been 
created by the vociferous Ian Paisley in the early 1970s.30 The 
UUP's electoral support was somewhat battered from the leadership 
struggles of the previous decade hut it still claimed the largest 
percentage of the Unionist vote. The DUP, on the other hand, had 
gone from being a "minor irritant on the unionist periphery" to being 
the second-largest party in Ulster unionism)! A glance at Table I 
will show how the two have fought elections in the past decade often 
within close margins of one another. Generally it can be said that the 
UUP fares better in Westminster elections than the DUP, and that the 
bulk of the DUP's representation is at the local level. While in the 
past few years the DUP seems perhaps to have reached a plateau in 
its growth of support, it remains a vibrant and extreme voice of 
Protestant Unionism. 
Table I 
1982 1983 1985 1986 1987 
(Assem.} (Westmin} (Loc. Gvt.} (Westmin} (Westmin} 
UUP 29.7% 34.0% 29.4% 51.7% 37.8% 
DUP 23.0% 20'()% 24.3% 14.6% 11.7% 
The moderate end of Protestant politics is contained within the 
Alliance Party. Though it can only loosely he classed as a 'unionist' 
party, the religiously-mixed Alliance deserves mentioning, for the 
fact that this rather moderate, consensus-oriented party attracts 
support from both communities. The Marxist historian Michael 
Farrell has described it as: 
A non-sectarian moderate Unionist party. Committed 
to maintaining the link with Britain but reforming the 
Northern state. Set up in April 1970 and has substantial 
Catholic membership as well as Protestant membership. 
Its support and membership is overwhelmingly middle-c1ass.3 2 
As the persistence of the conflict in. Northern Ireland will attest, the 
tolerant message of the Alliance Party has largely gone unheeded, 
and those subscribing to the party arc only a fraction of the total 
Protestant population. Their electoral base has been evaluated by 
Arthur and Jeffery: 
[The Alliance Party J did not seem to relate to the emotions 
of the combatants, and it was this self-conscious thrust 
towards reason and reasonableness which appears may have 
made it redundant. . . When intercommunal tensions rise Alliance 
support dips ... While it can hope to muster about 10% of the 
total vote, it cannot, however, hope to form a government at 
some future date) 3 
Their views are significant, however, because the Alliance party is 
the often disparagingly described "mythical center" in Northern Irish 
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politics that seeks a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland through mutual compromise. This sort of consensus politics, 
however, is the sort of "creeping Republicanism" that the most 
garrisonistic of Ulster Protestants fear-the politics of Lundies, in 
other words. Indeed, there seems to be evidence for this contention 
in the electoral patterns of Alliance. If, as asserted in the above 
quote, Alliance support fades in times of crisis, it seems entirely 
logical that this is substantially due to increased garrisonism amongst 
Ulster Protestants, for if the communal dichotomies are sharper than 
normal, it seems that the majority of Protestants would be even less 
disposed to seek compromise. 
In summation, we can see that there were four broad stages in 
the development of present-day unionism. The first parallels the 
rise and semi-fruition of the Irish Home Rule movement in the late 
nineteenth century. Here the links between Protestantism and 
unionism were forged and given political expression. The second 
stage ,was the Stormont years of 1922-1972, called "Fifty years of 
Unionist misrule" by civil rights marchers but looked on as the 
"Golden Age of Ulster Unionism" by many Protestants. The turbulent 
O'Neill years that preceded the current conflict brought about the 
first insurmountable fissures in the Unionist Party's history, and the 
dogfight that followed to be the flagship of unionism, compose the 
third stage. Finally, the present situation finds the UUP and the DUP 
cautiously trading barbs but neither actively seeking the destruction 
of the other, and this is the fourth stage of Unionist development. In 
the next chapter, I plan to examine how the differences between the 
Protestant denominations provide at least a plausible explanation for 
these divisions in Ulster Unionism, and to draw a few conclusions 
about the parallels between religious and political behavior in the 
Ulster Protestant commun ity. 
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2Lyons,!reland Since the Famine.p. 290-2. 
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5Miller.Queen's Rebels.p. 64. 
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ANGLICANS AND PRESRYTERJANS 
Having outlined the basic history of the Ulster unionism and 
briefly discussed its role in the Northern Irish political environment, 
I will now describe the what I consider to be the major cleavage 
dividing the Protestant community: the differences between the 
major denominations in Northern Ireland. The two primary 
Protestant denominations in Northern Ireland are the Church of 
Ireland and the various Presbyterian churches. Between them, they 
claim 82% of the Protestant population of the province.! Despite the 
fact that they appeared in Ireland at approximately the same time, 
these groups have different theological beliefs and their 
memberships have noticeable geograph ic and socio-economic 
characteristics. These differences call into question the conventional 
wisdom that holds the Protestants of Northern Ireland to be a 
monolithic group. 
As I have previously mentioned, these variances have not 
received the attention given other, more glaring differences In 
Northern Irish politics, particularly those between the Protestant and 
Roman Catholic communities in the province. Though hardly the 
decisive factor in Northern Irish politics, the differences between the 
Church of Ireland and the Presbyterians serve as divisive factors 
within the Unionist community for two major reasons: one, the 
Church of Ireland's history of advantage, both economic and political, 
is mirrored by a history of Anglican discrimination against the 
Presbyterian churches; and two, the theologies of the two bodies lead 
to friction between the fundamentalist Presbyterians and the more 
liberal Anglicans of the Church of Ireland. The political ramifications 
of this are that, one, the Church of Ireland has developed in relative 
security, and thus is traditionally more amenable to compromise, and 
two, the relatively liberal theology ()f the Church of Ireland makes its 
members more tolerant of the religious differences between it and 
the Catholic church, thus removing a major barrier to compromise 
with the religious community. That is, since its views are at least 
formally similar to the Catholic church's, it is more difficult for 
Anglicans to view the Roman Cathol ic commun i ty as spiri 1 U ~t1ly 
wayward or in danger of eternal damnation. Thus, these Anglican 
qualities lead to mistrustful feelings amongst a substantial portion of 
the Presbyterian membership. Their hi story of rugged defi ance in 
the face of persecution combined with their strict, fundamentalist, 
Calvinistic religious views make them much more intolerant of 
differences and much more unlikely to compromise on any issue 
with the Roman Catholic community. 
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Though this chapter is primarily concerned with examInIng the 
differences between the memberships of the Church of Ireland and 
the Presbyterians, it must also be noted that they share one 
important characteristic that overshadows many of these other 
frictions: when one looks at the island as a whole, both of these 
denominations are tiny minorities compared to the Irish Roman 
Catholic population. This Catholic numerical superiority frightens 
both Anglicans and Presbyterians into unison on the all-important 
issue of the union with Britain. This issue takes precedence over 
virtually all internal tensions within the Ulster Protestant 
community, particularly in times of cnsls. Thus, when examining the 
differences between these two major denominations, it mllst not be 
forgotten that they remain cohesive on this one burning and, in 
Northern Ireland, supreme issue. JIaving made this clear, it is 
possible to proceed with the study of the divisions that do divide the 
Protestant community. 
The first major difference between the Church of Ireland and 
the Irish Presbyterian churches I ies in the hi storical legacy that has 
been handed down to each denomination. The history of the Church 
of Ireland during its early years differs from that of its English 
progenitor. The mutual martyrdoms of individuals from either the 
Church of England or the Catholic church (depending upon the winds 
of political fortune) did not occur with such frequency or fervor in 
Ireland. Rather, it seems that the Gaelic chieftains under the nominal 
control of Henry VIII quietly submitted to conversion while their 
subjects and even their households remained practicing Catho1ics. 
However, in this age of wars between Protestant and Catholic states, 
such a strategic island as Ireland had to be firmly under Protestant 
control in order for England to be secure from attack from England's 
ever-present Catholic rivals, Prance and Spain. A major step towards 
this end occurred when Queen E.Iizabeth I made the Church of 
Ireland the "Church, established by law" by issuing the Act of 
Supremacy and the Act of Uniformity through the Irish Parliament in 
1560. Protestant control of Ireland was consolidated by the 
Williamite wars of the late 1680s and early 1690s. As the 
established church, the Church of Ireland was the only religious body 
officially recognized by the government for almost two and a half 
centuries. Membership was required before one could vote, own 
more than a certain amount of property, or hold any political office. 
The effect of this was to give a virtual monopoly on the economic and 
political leadershi p of the island at least unti I the closure of the Irish 
Parliament by the 1801 Act of Union, which ironically was resisted 
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by the "Protestant Ascendancy," as this socio-political dominance of 
the Church of Ireland's membership has been referred to. 
The Union with Britain did not greatly diminish the Anglicans' 
near-stranglehold on power, but the first tidings of its loosening was 
the 1829 "Catholic Emancipation "-the climax of Daniel O'Connell's 
successful fight to allow Irish Catholics the right to become Members 
of Parliament (MP's). Though the United Kingdom's voting 
requirements still effectively excluded much of the poorer Catholic 
population of the island from using the suffrage, this event heralded 
the beginning of the end of Anglican control of Ireland. The Church 
of Ireland was formally dis-established in 1869, meaning in theory 
that all the privileges and advantages enjoyed by its members might 
be enjoyed by all regardless of their faith. However, the inertia of 
prolonged influence continued only slightly diminished into at least 
the early twentieth century. For example, one researcher has noted 
that compared to their percentage of the population, members of the 
Church of Ireland were strongly and thus disproportionately 
represented In the business anc! professional classes. 2 It is also 
interesting to note a fact that was unsettling to many Protestants in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century: the early leaders of the 
Irish Home Rule movement, Isaac Butt and Charles Parnell, were 
both members of the Church of Ireland, a fact which also is a 
precedent for Presbyterian doubts about the resolve of Anglican 
church members to cling to the union with Britain. 
Compared to this early history of powerful political and socio-
economIc influence, the Presbyterians in Ireland were an oppressed 
group. Though Protestant, they suffered almost as greatly as 
Catholics for their adherence to their faith. Brought over from 
Scotland most dramatically by the Plantation but also from the 
inevitable immigration that occurs between two lands of such 
proximity, the Presbyterian encoun~.erec! at best indifference and at 
times open discrimination from their Anglican lords, particularly 
under the post-Williamite Penal Laws that were instituted to help 
establish the dominance of the Anglican church. As one recent 
Unionist MP has written of this time: 
The Presbyterian found himself, or felt himself, at odds 
both with Popery and with the resented predominance 
of Anglican Squire and Parson. Anglican and Dissenter 
(as all non-Anglican Protestants were known), all must 
pay tithes to the Church of Ellgland.] 
This assumed Preudian slip on the part of the Presbyterian author 
implies that the Anglican church was somehow "foreign" to the 
Presbyterians, for, mistakenly or otherwise, he refers to the Church 
of Ireland as the Church of England. Given Protestant garrisonism 
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towards Britain and particularly towards the English, there is 
probably a deeper meaning to his phraseology than a simple 
misprint. At any rate, the payment of tithes to the established 
church was not the only restriction imposed upon the Presbyterians 
in Ire]and. For a time, Presbyterian marriages-and thus the children 
of these marriages-were not recognized as legitimate by the 
government. Likewise, Presbyterian religious meetings were 
sometimes banned, and the rigorously faithful were driven to such 
acts of defiance as rowing over the twe] ve-mile stretch of choppy 
water that separates Ire]and and Scotland in order to take the 
Presbyterian communion. Still more lost substantia] amounts of 
property for their adherence to their faith. PrC"sbyterian 
disgruntlement with this state of affairs was quite violently 
expressed in the often examined United Irishmen Rebellion of 1798. 
Though a military disaster for the rebels, it is especia]ly memorable 
because Irish Preshyterians hriefly united with the Roman Catholics 
of the island in the hopes of gaining Irish independence. Though this 
alliance quickly dissipated, Preshyterian distaste for the Protestant 
Ascendancy was amply registered hy this insurgency. What is 
important about these historical facts is that persecution had the 
double effect of leaving the Presbyterian pews peopled by only the 
staunchest believers while at the same time creating a heritage of 
strong-willed resistance to temporal tampering into either religious 
or pol itical affairs i mportan t to Ulster Presbyterians. Hence 
Presbyterians were self-selected by history as those who voluntarily 
took the more difficult path of commitment to a fervently followed 
set of beliefs, and a resignation to the persecution that entailed. This 
contrasts with the tendency for the relative complacency of the 
membership in an established church(here the Church of Ireland), as 
I shall later elaborate upon.4 
At the beginning of the ni~~teenth century, the Penal Laws 
were repealed and open discrimination against Presbyterians became 
more the exception than the rule. Still, as one author has delicately 
phrased it, "relations between the Preshyterians and the Church of 
Ireland were anything but cordial. "5 In the 1840s, there were also 
schisms in the Presbyterian church that led to the creation of the 
Non -subscri bi ng and Non -conformi n g branches of the ch urch. 
Though considered extremely important at the time of the break, the 
actual theological disputes are relatively inconsequential to the focus 
of this paper. Still, this tendency to split is representative of the 
powerful insistence upon personal interpretation of scripture that is 
a basic part of the inherent fundamentalism of the Presbyterian 
church. It also shows to what lengths some strong-willed 
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Presbyterians are prepared to go in oreler that their personal beliefs 
will be satisfied, for it IS deemed better to dissociate than to risk 
"spiritual contamination" as a result of compromise about firmly held 
beliefs. 
To change focus, it is helpful to examine the political behavior 
of both Anglican and Dissenters in the nineteenth century. Even at 
this time there was a decided difference between the political 
behavior of the two groups. Part of this difference was the 
traditional association of the established church in both England and 
Ireland with the Conservative Party. Often called the "Tory Party at 
prayer," the Anglican Church of Ireland shared this connection with 
its English progenitor. Conversely, the Presbyterians tended towards 
the opposing political viewpoint of the Liberal Party. Describing both 
this condition as well as the ramifications of the 1798 rebellion upon 
Presbyterians, Stewart has written that: 
If the Presbyterians ceased to be nationalists. they 
did not cease to be liberals. and they instinctively 
chose the opposite side politically from the Tories of 
the Established Church. Although conservative 
Presbyterians and Anglicans grew closer together. 
especially after Catholic Emancipation. Liberalism 
(with a capital 'L') was still strong in Ulster until 
1886.6 
Thus, the Home Rule issue took precedence over fundamental 
Presbyterian opposition to the religious and political views of many of 
the members of the Church of Ireland. In a less tumultuous political 
landscape the existing political cleavages would in all likelihood have 
caused readily noticeable factional infighting. This did not occur 
during the fight against the Home Rule bills. Thus, contentious rivalries 
were subordinated in the face of the rise of a greater threat: Irish 
Home Rule and the resulting growth of the Roman Catholic power in 
Ireland. As has already been stated many times, the prospect of 
Roman Catholic power forced Prot'e"st"ants to resolve their differences 
or lose their combined political influence. Though the political history 
of the two groups from this point onwards is basically that of 
unionism, it should not be inferred that the Presbyterians and the 
Church of Ireland became one homogenous group. They created a 
political coalition, and were thus a group formed from diverse 
interests who shared the defeat of Home Rule as their primary 
political goal. 
These different historical heritages have produced a number of 
current distinctions between the Presbyterians and the Anglicans in 
the north of Ireland. For example, the Church of Ireland and the 
Presbyterians differ demographically from one another. Most of 
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Ul ster' s Presbyterian popul ation is contai ned In the two Belfast 
counties of Antrim and Down, and they tend to be more populous in 
Northern Ireland's two cities, Belfast and Londonderry/Derry.7 
Church of Ireland members, on the other hand, tend to reside in the 
more rural areas-for example, in the two least populous counties in 
Northern Ireland, Fermanagh and Tyrone, the Church of Ireland claims 
the largest percentage of the Protestant population; in Fermanagh 
alone, they outnumber Presbyterians almost 10 to 1.8 To these 
elements of urban/rural tension are added socio-economic tensions, 
for while there seems to be little difference in the actual amounts 
earned by Presbyterians and Anglicans, employment that requires 
"connections"-such as the civil service or the diplomatic corps- is 
predominated by those from the Church of Ireland. For example,15% 
of those Church of Ireland members who have jobs are employed by 
the government in the civil service, while only 5% of the Presbyterian 
work force finds itself in these sought-after positions. In the 
diplomatic service, differences are even more dramatic; Church of 
Ireland employees outnumbers the Presbyterians almost 3 to 1.9 
Though these economic distinctions are not quite as sharp as the 
geographical differences, the apparent difference in influence would 
support the contention that it is still possible for Presbyterians to feel 
like outsiders. In this way, the legacy of the history of Anglican 
privilege still affects political relations within the Ulster Protestant 
community in two ways: subjectively, for the Presbyterians remember 
the way their forefathers suffered for their faith almost as fondly as 
they recall the founding of the UYF or the 1690 Battle of the Boyne; 
and objectively, particularly when the differences of demography and 
apparent influence are taken into consideration. Though not as 
noticeable as the differences between Protestants and Roman Catholics 
in the province, these differences and their resulting tensions 
contribute to and exacerbate the. gl}rrisonism of the Ulster Protestant 
community. 
In addition to having different histories and thus different 
membership compositions as a result of this dissimilar past, the 
Church of Ireland and the Presbyterian church also differ 
theologically. I contend that the primary difference between the 
Presbyterians and the Church of Ireland lies in the area of scriptural 
interpretation. I n short, the Presbyteri ans tend towards a more 
fundamentalist view of scripture while the Church of Ireland 
subscribes to a more liberal interpretation of the Bible. According to 
the religious scholar Roger Schmidt, this conflict between liberal and 
fundamentalist views is the "primary division within Christendom 
tod ay" .10 His definition of scriptural fundamentalism is a belief in 
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the Bible as God's revealed word, thus making it either totally 
inerrant or at least literally correct about doctrinal matters. On the 
other hand, a liberal view of scripture is marked not only by a 
critical view of the historical context of these writings, but also by 
bel iefs and practices which are shaped by church traditions and 
secular knowledge. II These traits can be observed in the 
organization of the churches and in their different practices, and this 
in turn highlights the fundamental/liberal dichotomy eXlsttng 
between the theologies of the Church of Ireland and the Presbyterian 
churches. 
The primary difference in the organization of these two 
denominations is the concept of' the source of authority regarding 
church matters. In the Church of Ireland, the Archbishop of Dublin 
has final authority on most issues,' with only some deference to the 
Archbishop of Canterbury. Thus, power in the Church of Ireland 
flows from the top to the bottom. On the other hand, the source of 
power for Presbyterians resides in the individual congregations, or 
Presbyteries. Delegates (usually elders or ministers) are sent to a 
synod, which in turn sends delegates to the General Assembly of the 
Irish Presbyterian Churches, where matters of widespread concern 
are decided by majority vote. The resemblance to modern 
legislatures is clear. 









The charts help illustrate the general organizational structure 
of the two denominations. Though structurally similar, the power 
flow within the bodies is the most revealing characteristic. An 
example of these differing concepts of the source of authority in 
matters of church existence is wel1 illustrated by the manner in 
which ministers come to their respective congregations. In the 
Church of Ireland, pastors are ordained and then assigned to a 
congregation. In the Presbyterian churches, however, ministers are 







if the Presbytery approves, he may then be "cal1ed" by that 
congregation to be its minister. The difference in these two 
procedures is that the Presbyterian mode of choosing both elders and 
ministers comes straight from Paul's letter to Timothy regarding this 
topic. 12 These passages describe the appointment to either of these 
posItIOns as a communal decision of the individual congregation and 
set forth guidelines to be considered. On the other hand, the 
Anglican church continued the practice established by its immediate 
predecessor, the Roman Catholic church, which called for pastors, 
priests, and the rest of the church hierarchy to be appointed by the 
Archbishop. Thus, the Presbyterians established their practice on 
scriptural admonition which is a decidedly fundamentalist practice, 
while the Church of Ireland followed church tradition, thus taking a 
liberal view of the passages in question. 
Likewise, the Presbyterian church tends to shun religious 
practices which are not expressly called for by the New Testament. 
For example, the use of liturgy-set prayers and responses-is 
decidedly absent from Irish Presbyterian services. In fundamentalist 
faiths prayers are meant to be spontaneous expressions of worship 
and supplication to God. Contrari ly, the Church of Ireland, along with 
other Episcopal churches, practices liturgy, embodied in the Book of 
Common Prayer. Contrasting the practice of the two denominations, 
the Anglican use of liturgy is a strong example of a church tradition 
becoming a crucial part of the worship service. Since the New 
Testament has only one stylized prayer-the Lord's Prayer-[some 
fundamentalists argue that even this is only meant as a general 
guide], it can easily be seen that the Church of Ireland is more liberal 
in its interpretation of scripture than the Presbyterians. 
I contend that these two types of Christianity affect the voting 
behavior within the Protestant community of Northern Ireland. The 
fundamentalism of the Presbyterian .. ~._J~ads to a greater emphasis on 
personal actions and responsibilities in their religious life; this in 
turn leads to a greater tendency towards personal intransigence and 
activism in these people's political lives. The large number of 
Presbyterians who support the extremist Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) provides an excellent example of how this religious 
stubbornness translates into uncompromising political attitudes (see 
table next page). The members of the Church of Ireland, on the other 
hand, with their relatively accommodating views in religious matters, 
are marked by more flexible views in the political world. Again, 
their political affiliations represent this liberality, for as can be seen 
there are greater percentages of ,',Anglicans in the two moderate 
32 
unionist parties, the Alliance and the OUP, than the more numerous 
Pres byterian s. 
Politico-Religious Affiliation in Northern IreJand 13 
Denomination % in our % in our % Alliance % of Pop. 
Church of Ireland 21.6 44.0 23.3 18.2 
Presbyterian 44.8 31.2 22.8 23.0 
Free Presbyterian 9.5 not available 0.0 1.5 
Roman Catholic 0.0 0.0 44.0 28.0 
Other Protestant* 12.1 24.8 9.8 29.4 
*includes those who declined to state a religious preference 
The statistics show that as one progresses from the more extreme 
DUP to the most flexible unionist party, Alliance, (evidenced by the 
proportion of Catholics), the percentages of Presbyterians drop while 
those of the Church of Ireland increase. It thus seems clear that 
there are connections between a Protestant's denomination and 
his/her political orientation. Likewise, these numbers correspond 
with my assertion that fundamentalism produces uncompromising 
unIOnIsm. Though it should again be clearly stated that these 
differences are extremely broad and serve only as general indicators 
of the political atmosphere of the Ulster Protestant community, one 
can plainly discern the trends I have been discussing. 
In assessing the political ramifications of these historical and 
theological differences between the Church of Ireland and the 
Presbyterian churches, two primary conclusions may be drawn. One 
is that the Presbyterian history of discrimination under the 
Anglicans makes the Presbyterian of today acutely aware of both 
this heritage of oppression and their defiant resistance of it. Two, 
the Church of Ireland's role in this discrimination combined with 
their less-fundamentalist theological stance makes Presbyterians 
suspect both the Anglicans' steadfastness as well as their political 
motives. Thus, the Grand Master of the Orange Order, who is also a 
Presbyterian minister, can speill:· with subtle pride that his 
"Presbyterian forbears knew something of the wrath of the Penal 
Laws," and in this example of stubborn adherence to principles find 
an example to guide him in both his religious and political behavior 
of the present. 14 The eminent Irish historian A.T.Q. Stewart 
comments on this point: I, 
The Presbyterian is happiest when he is being a radical. 
The austere doctrines of Calvinism, the simplicity of his , 
worship the democratic government of his church, the 
memory or the Martyred Covenanters, Ihe Scottish rerusal 
to yield or disscmblc--all these incline him to that difficult 
and cantankerous disposition which is characleristic of a 
certain kind of political radicalism. His nalura) inslinct is 
to dislrllsl Ihe oll/ward forms of civil government unless 
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they arc consonant with his religious principles. On the 
other hand, his situation and his history in a predomi-
nantly Catholic Ireland have bred in him attitudes which 
seem opposite to these, making him defensive, intolerant, 
and uncritically to traditions and institutions.! 5 
The paradox of an intense desire for religious liberty leading to an 
oppression of others' right to enjoy the same thing lies at the heart of 
Protestant garrisonism; likewise, the heart of garrisonism lies In 
Ulster Presbyterianism. To them, the stakes in the political game of 
the province are too high to allow for any compromise, be it religious 
or political-indeed, the two are often treated as equivalent issues in 
the political dialogue lor lack thereofl in Northern Irish circles. 
If the heart of garrisonism is Presbyterianism, then :t follows 
that the Church of Ireland will be less staunchly "Unionist," in the 
general sense of the term, extending to such related issues as 
economic concessions to Ulster's Catholic population. These 
concessions are precisely what is feared by many Presbyterians, and 
thus gives rise to the concerns of many Presbyterians that the 
Church of Ireland is more likely to produce "Lundies," and influential 
Lundies at that, who could potentially betray all the civil and 
religious liberties enjoyed by the Ulster Protestants. As irrational as 
this might sound to those familiar with the use of consensus politics 
as the best way forward, it is symptomatic of the zero-sum political 
environment in the province. One writer has described this fear that 
haunts, even peripherally, the decisions of many Presbyterian 
Unionists: 
The professional and managerial classes to be round in 
the Church of Ireland ... tend to view politics in the 
rationalistic and pragmatic terms common to most 
soclettes. For them, Ulster's troubles are resolvable 
through balance, compromise, and mulual toleration 
resolving conflict. They would make substantial con-
cessions to Catholics to rationalise a disrupted political 
environmenl,(emphasis ~ld~i'e'd")16 
In other words, Anglican loyalty to the union, to Protestantism, and, 
by association to Ulster, stands the greatest chance of wavering-
because their religious liberality is of len translated into a political 
liberality (in the Northern Irish context), and they are perceived to 
be the most likely to become "Lundies"by many of the Ulster 
Presbyterians. This adds a special meaning to Unionist fears of the 
Anglican O'Neill's reforms, for any move towards consensus on his 
part was more liable to be suspected by Presbyterians of traitorous 
intent than if he had been of Presbyterian stock. Though it would be 
absurd to say that it was solely O'Neill's religion that made him 
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suspect in the eyes of many Unionists, it would he equally mistaken 
to merely ignore this aspect of the struggle. 
To conclude, it seems that the differences between the two 
main Protestant denominations influence Northern Irish politics in 
three ways. One is that the history of rivalry and animosity between 
Presbyterian and Anglican has resulted In demographic and 
economic differences in the present day that lead to tangible friction 
within the Ulster Unionist community. Two, the theological 
differences he tween the two denominations arise from a conflict of 
fundamentalist and liberal interpretations of scripture. This in turn 
translates into varying degrees of political garrisonism represented 
by the inverse proportions of memhership in the three main Unionist 
parties. Three, it seems that the heart of Ulster Protestant 
garrisonism lies in Ulster Presbyterianism, for its unyielding theology 
and practice produce parallel political qualities that make 
compromise over apparently secular issues equally difficult. 
Having examined the hasic reasons and ramifications of this 
dichotomy between the Church of Ireland and the Presbyterians, two 
case studies from both ends of the fundamentalist/liberal spectrum 
in Northern Ireland need to he examined in order to illustrate the 
scope of these differences: the special case of the Reverend Ian 
Paisley, and Protestant division over the nature of the ecumenical 
movement. These two studies will help to further highlight the 
denominational split within Northern Irish Protestantism, one with a 
predominantly political focus-the Rev. Paisley-and one with 
primarily a religious focus-the ecumenical movement. 
1 Moxon-Browne,Nation,Class, and Creed in Northern Ircland,p.89. 
2McMinn,"Presbylery and Politics in Ireland", Month, p. 131. 
3Biggs-Davidson, The Hand is Red, p.12. 
4Schmidl, Exploring Religion, p.308-312. 
5Barkeley, in Hurley, Irish Anglicllnis,;l,'p.·· ()S. 
6Stewart,Narrow Grounli,p.163. 
7Norlhern Ireland Census,IIMSO,p.SO. 
8Ibid.,p.50. 
9Ibid.,p.89. 
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"THE RIG MAN"; IAN PAISLEY 
Lord, we pray this night for this land! Save us from 
all our enemies! Defeat the IRA and all its evil machi-
nationsL .. We pray that thou wouldst work in our 
land, and keep us pure, and keep us uncompromising 
I shouts of amen I in our Protestant convictions, and in 
our stand for Christ. .. Turn Ulster back to God! Back to 
the right paths of righteousness! Smash Popery in our 
land, and all its deceptions! Deal with the ecumenical 
deceivers, the peddJcrs of false gospels. We pray that 
Thou would expose them for what they arc! 1 
Appearances can often deceive. What might initially appear to 
be the ramblings of a street-corner preacher are words that were 
fervently prayed by the man who is "the most popular politician in 
Ulster in recent years," and who has been Northern Ireland's only 
elected representative to the European Parliament since elections 
have been held for the position (1979).2 The Reverend Doctor Ian 
R.K. Paisley MP, is perhaps the most controversial figure in 
Protestant politics in Northern Ireland. One fellow Unionist called 
him the "Demon Doctor", and a pair of his hiographers have said that 
he "dominates the Northern Irish scene like a malign colossus." To 
his devoted following, however, his dire warnings and predictions 
seemed to be proven when Northern Ireland was plunged into 
political chaos in 1969, thus making him a prophet in the eyes of 
some. One ardent supporter has said that Paisley "is a man raised up 
by God in Ulster's hour of need."3 Paisley's divisive message has 
made him famous in the British Isles as perhaps the most strident of 
Ulster Unionists; however, this extremism does not relegate him to 
the fringes of Northern Irish politics. Examining this paragon of 
Protestant garrisonism is important as a case study of the "siege 
mentality", for his political influence in the province is massive. 
There are three primary characteristics of Ian Paisley's 
influence upon Northern Irish Protestant politics. One, his religious 
views are characteristic of a theologically uncompromising Calvinism 
that often equates rei igious issues with pol i tical issues. For example, 
its virulent anti-Catholicism leads to garrisonism hecause, in Irish 
politics, a fear of Roman Catholicism automatically implies a fear of 
Irish Nationalism. Likewise, its emphasis lIpon individualism leads 
to an ultra-activism that frustrates attempts at compromise. Two, 
though his theology and his politics are extreme within the Unionist 
spectrum, the fact of his electoral success shows that even though all 
his views may not he held by his political supporters, he strikes the 
most vibrant chord of any Northern Irish politician amongst Ulster 
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Protestants. Third, the group represented by Paisley is perhaps the 
most active, vocal, and u ncorn proml sIng wi th i n the Protestan t 
community, and they stand firmly in the way of any political moves 
that seem accomodating of the Roman Catholic community. 
Before discussing the characteristics of this influence, it is 
helpful to first relate some features of Paisley's personal background. 
Ian Robert Kyle Paisley was born in the staunchly Protestant town of 
Ballymena, County Antrim, the son of a Presbyterian minister who 
was also a member of the original UVF. His childhood was 
surrounded by the political violence that occurred with the founding 
of Northern Ireland in the 1920s. In his mid-twenties he entered 
the Presbyterian ministry, but soon thereafter left to form his own 
church-the Free Presbyterian Church-where his ultra-
fundamentalism could flourish as he saw fit. His political activism 
dates back to his teen years when he was a member of the Orange 
Order. 4 Paisley emerged as a political leader, however, in the mid-
1950s when the Irish Republ ican Army's "Border Campaign" was at 
its peak. The Border Campaign was a series of raids and bombings 
primarily of army installations on the Northern Ireland-Republic of 
Ireland border primarily in 1956, but which continued sporadically 
until 1961.5 Paisley founded an extremist group called Ulster 
Protestant Action (UPA), which, among other things, demanded the 
wholesale internment of Roman Catholics suspected of Republican 
actIvItIes. The fairly swift resolution of this outbreak of violence 
and the fact that O'Neill's mildly reformist program met apparent 
initial acceptance within the Protestant community meant that 
Paisley's warnings of Catholic subversion made him a. voice in the 
political wilderness. lie formed the Independent Orange Order, and 
the UPA was transformed into the Ulster Protestant Volunteers 
(UPV), another group that was decidedly against any concessions to 
the Roman Catholic minority in tJ!.~ .. province. Though the group's 
following increased as the tide of Unionist popular opinion turned 
against O'Neill, it still remained a fringe group at the outbreak of 
violence in August 1969. In many Protestants' eyes, however, 
Paisley had been at the very least proven more accurate than other 
Unionist politicians by the events of that summer. Paisley also 
contributed to the downfall of Terence O'Neill by competing against 
him in O'Neill's home seat of Bannside in a 1969 general election. 
Though O'Neill won the election, it was only by a margin of 1,414 
votes. This was a considerably smaller margin than had been 
predicted for the previously 'safe' seat and many took this to be an 
overall Unionist rejection of O'Neillite reformsJI 
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Paisley's shouts of "O'Neill must go!" changed to "Chichester-
Clarke must go!" and ultimately into "Faulkner must go!" as the Ulster 
Unionist Party (UUP) struggled to find a leader. The Unionists 
opposed to the Sunningdale Agreement formed the United Ulster 
Unionist Council (UUUC). Paisley took a leading role in this 
organization. Ironically, his popular standing seems to have taken a 
fall during the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) strike of 1974. Paisley 
initially opposed the stoppage, but as the popular will seemed to 
support it, he jumped on the bandwagon. This U-turn made him 
seem less of a prophet and more of an opportunist in the eyes of 
many Protestants. For example, one UWC pamphlet has said of this 
campaign that, "Paisley ... scarcely raised a ripple of concern In the 
Protestant community ... he was never so isolated politically as in the 
month after Sunningdale."7 
The Reverend Doctor may have been down, but he was hardly 
out. While the Unionists groped for a strong leader, Paisley's voice 
carried, and indeed, still carries, a consistent message that upholds 
beliefs firmly rooted in the minds of many Ulster Protestants. 8 
Foremost in th is message I s a den u nc i ati on of attempts at 
compromise with the Roman Catholic community, primarily for three 
different reasons. One, the "zero-sum" political culture of the 
province means that similar to an athletic contest, if the Roman 
Catholics win, then the Protestants must lose. Logic implies, and such 
researchers as Nelson, Moloney and Pollak have claimed, that there 
is an obvious motivation to deny the Catholic community any "wins."9 
Two, any "win" thus gained by the Roman Catholic community 
additionally adds momentum to the IRA, who, Paisley claims, find in 
this perceived victory legitimation for further acts of terrorism. 
Thus, it is logical to say that Paisley feels that any unforced 
compromise with the Roman Catholic community will be interpreted 
as weakness by the IRA, who wou,I~LJhen be emboldened to increase 
their efforts. Three, Paisley's religious views include a fierce 
opposition to the Papacy on a theological basis. Though I will later 
elaborate upon the specific aspects of this, suffice it to say that 
though his religious views do not have numerically that strong a 
following, his political message rings true to many Ulster unionists. 
As has been noted, by the early 1980s the Unionists were divided 
into two main camps: the OUP, headed by Molyneaux, and the DUP 
headed by Paisley, and these remain the two main camps within 
Ulster Unionism at the present time. 
Ian Paisley's theological beliefs 
characteristics. One of these IS an 
Roman Catholic church with a 
have a number of interesting 
uncompromising hatred of the 
ferocity reminiscent of the 
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Reformation. BeIl has said that "when Paisley thundered against the 
Catholic Church he was not criticizing a religious institution or an 
erroneous interpretation of the Bible; he was taking on the Devil 
himself."lo By saying this, Bell means that Ian Paisley literalIy 
believes that the Pope to be the Antichrist. Indeed, there is 
considerable self-testimony to this effect. I I For example, Paisley 
wrote in a tract denouncing the Papal visit to the United Kingdom lf1 
1982 that: 
The Popes of Rome for centuries have, under the title 
of Vicar of Christ, been masquerading as Christs. Ever 
since the Bishop of Rome got a taste for power early in the 
Christian era, he yeIJed,'" am Christ", and right down 
to Pope John Paul " they have been yeIJing it, shouting 
it, trumpeting it, and parroting it. .. This is the confession 
of the Antichrist. Thank God we recognize him.l2 
Likewise, Paisley has written the following passage In a tract 
unsurprisingly titled Antichrist : 
The Pope, the Vicar of Christ, is the Man of Sin(prophesied 
by the Scriptures). lie has invented sin, he has taught sin, 
he has enacted sin, established iniquity by law, he trades in 
sins and has grown rich through the sins of Christendom. 
Sin is the Pope's work. Sin is the Pope's being. Popery is the 
incarnation of sin as the Gospel is the incarnation of holiness. 
The policy of the Pope as Antichrist is not to deny truth but 
to pervert truth. l 3 
Besides revealing the fact that Paisley helieves the Pope to be the 
Antichrist, this passage also shows two other important aspects of 
Paisley's theology. By saying the Pope perverts truth, Paisley is 
automatically wary of the initiatives of the Roman Catholic church, 
for hy this test, no matter how logical a Catholic initiative might 
appear, it is fundamentalIy evil according to Paisley's theology, and 
thus he opposes it. Furthermore, by call ing the Gospel the 
"incarnation of holiness", Paisley gives the reader some idea of the 
depth of his fundamentalism. 
When these dimensions of Paisley's theological beliefs are 
acknowledged, his extreme garrisonism begins to make more sense. 
If a united Ireland means a rise to power of the Catholic church, then 
Paisley's homeland would be controlled hy the Antichrist, and that 
would be unthinkable. This view of Roman Catholicism as evil 
incarnate makes compromise with the Roman Catholic community 
virtually impossihle. This opposition to the Papacy is also a prime 
example of how religion and politics overlap one another in the 
figure of Ian Paisley, and hy association, the politics of Northern 
Ireland. 
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The Reverend's justification for his VIew of the Pope as 
Antichrist is dependent upon a strict reading of the Book of 
Revelations and passages from Matthew 24:5, along with a sprinkling 
of Old Testament prophecies. 14 This strict interpretation of scripture 
is a salient point of Paisley's ultra-fundamentalism that pervades all 
of his preaching and political proselytizing. For example, Paisley has 
written that the "three most important duties of religion" are private 
prayer, Bible reading, and meditation upon these passages. The 
personal, individualistic nature of these tasks are fairly obvious In 
light of both his insistence upon scriptural literality and the primary 
responsibility of the individual to actively pursue this "divinely 
revealed" course, Paisley clearly fulfills the definitbn of a 
fundamen tal i s t. 
I-I a vi n g not edt his, i tis p r u den t toe x amI n ePa i s ley's 
relationship with mainstream Presbyterianism. His general relation 
to Presbyterianism has been assessed by B rooke, who described it as 
both "overlapping" yet "independent" from Ulster Presbyterianism, 
with the primary difference being both an emphasis upon individual 
converSIOn and a strong commitment to their "new Life" as one born 
agai n .15 McSweeney more directly states that: 
. . .Northern Ireland's mainstream Preshyterianism 
differs from the fundamentalist evangelical Preshy-
terianism typified by Ian Paisley oilly in fervour and 
intensity of belief. I 0 
Thus Paisley's Free Presbyterianism is a 
Presbyterianism that takes the inherent 
Irish Presbyterianism (i.e, scriptural 
responsibility) and emphasizes them 
fanaticism. 
focused, extreme brand of 
fundamental qualities of 
literality and individual 
nearl y to the point of 
This emphasis upon the individual, both through personal 
commitment and the pursuance of an active faith extends into the 
political arena. Paisley and his DUP· are perhaps the most vocal and 
outspoken party in the Northern Irish political landscape. For 
example, Paisley went to the European Parliament to denounce a 
visit by the Pope so vociferously that he was almost forcibly 
removed from the chamber. Likewise, when a Roman Catholic priest 
addressed an ecumenical gathering in the Church of Ireland's St. 
Anne's Cathedral in Belfast, a group of Paisleyite demonstrators stood 
outside chanting "No Pope I [ere", among other things. When speaking 
about the IRA hunger strikers in 1981, Paisley stated that, "We have 
a choice to make. Shall we allow ourselves to be murdered by the 
IRA or shall we kill the killers?"!7 After the OUP MP for South 
Belfast, the Reverend Robert Bradford, was assassinated hy the IRA, 
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memorial speeches were made in the House of Commons. During 
these speeches, fel t to be "hypocritical" by many Unionists present, 
Paisley made "heated interventions" that led to his being suspended 
from the chamber. 18 
Is Paisley conscious of how his views, both political and 
religious, are viewed by the outside world? Most definitely; this is 
another importan t aspect of Pai s leyi te and indeed, Presbyteri an, 
activism-one is required to suffer if he is proclaiming a truth of 
which the world, blinded by sin and Satan, does not approve. For 
example, Paisley has written in one religious tract that: 
The voice of the [Protestant] martyr is heard in heaven. 
The text describes it as a 'loud voice' to which the Lord 
gives immediate attention. The voice of the martyrs is 
stifled and muffled by men on earth and those who would 
draw allention to their principles and sacrifices and 
indict the Roman murdress are discountenanced and dis-
credited. In heaven, however, their voice is heard and 
their faithfulness rewarded. Yes, and let it be remembered 
their illustrious roll is not yet completed. More of God's 
choice people will fall prey to the beast of Rome before 
God hurls His final anathema upon the whole Hellish 
system of Popery. The killing times and martyr pyres 
will shortly be again the experience of those who stand 
up for Christ against the Roman Antichrisl. 19 
The clear implication is that those who are "standing firm" today in 
the face of a world calling for consensus are following in the 
footsteps of those martyrs venerated by Ulster Protestants. It is 
equally clear that Paisley believes that those committed to God's 
work are certain to be persecuted, and, like the early Christians who 
beseeched the Emperor Nero to feed them to the lions, Paisley seeks 
controversy and demands his followers to take an actively 
uncompromISing, obstructionist stance both religiously and 
politically. 
Though Paisley's Pree Presbyteri-an church claims the al1egiance 
of 11,000 Northern Irish members (around 2% of the Protestant 
population of the province), his DUP has consistently received a 
larger proportion of the total vote than Free Presbyterian numbers 
alone could provide; this has already been outlined in the previous 
chapter on Unionism. 2o Por example, one survey of Democratic 
Unionists found a large percentage of mainstream Presbyterians and 
other Protestant denominations (Methodists, Baptists, etc.) with a 
number of A ngl icans as wel1. 21 This should not be surprising, for I 
have emphasized all along that the Presbyterian/ J\ ngl ican dichotomy 
is a relative one. There arc decided differences, but these are not so 
strong that they can in any way be considered to be absolutes. Thus 
42 
it seems that Paisley's religious views do not greatly hamper his 
political popularity. One researcher has assessed this quality: 
Paisley's dual role as leader of a church and political 
party is one ingredient of his success. Although not 
all his political supporters would subscribe to his doc-
trinal views, there seems no douht that Paisley's own 
brand of Protestantism provides an ideology that bears 
the same relation to the DUP's political tactics as Marxism 
docs to a Communist party in Eastern Europe. The 
ideology serves to legitimize political actions, it serves 
as a unifying force, but it is Oexible enough to be 
adapted to alternative policies in the pursuit of broadly 
similar goals. 22 
Thus it seems that while theology is a foundation for Unionist 
extremism, the actual number of those subscribing to Paisley's 
particular sect paradoxically make up only a small portion of his 
political organization, the DUP. Bell has commented upon this state of 
affairs: 
Protestant evangelists do not make up the majority 
of Protestants in Northern Ireland and it is not the defence 
of the social morality and the Protestant ethic which 
motivates the majority of the Protestants, but there are 
enough evangelists and enough moral outrage to have 
given Paisley a hearing and a following, and when he 
turned his brilliant oratory, his destructive wit, and his 
political allention to Unionist traitors, many more 
listened and followed. What the 'Big Man' promised was 
salvation: salvation from heretical faiths, and from 
political compromisers. 21 
If anything, Paisley and his followcrs posc a formidable barrier to 
compromise in Northcrn Ireland. 
What explains the political attraction of a man who virtually 
anywhere else (excepting the American South) would be considered 
a religious fanatic? There are a number of reasons that have been 
forwarded, but there are three that .?t?cm to have more validity than 
others. One holds that Paisley's rhetoric is simply a new twist on the 
old, traditional Ulster Unionist message: "No Surrender." As Nelson 
has pointed out, Paisley has combined tradition, recurring strands in 
Ulster political I ife (i.e., "the vital I ink between reI igion and politics", 
limited legitimation of Protestant political violence, and social 
conservatism) with a new and dynamic focus for political 
socialization-the DUP.24 She has written that Paisley: 
... expressed the beliefs of Protestants who saw a 
vital link between religion and politics, who viewed 
Protestantism as under constant threat from a mono· 
lithic and aggrandising Catholic Church. 25 
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Thus it seems that this explanation holds Paisley's electoral success 
to be rooted in the past and in the old fear that "Home rule means 
Rome rule." 
In the same vein, another observer has felt that it was this 
commitment to traditional "Ulster values" that is the key to Paisley's 
popularity: 
Ian Paisley has achieved his very considerable degree 
of success among Ulster Protestants because he has been 
able in both manner and message to project the tradi-
tional image and identity of conservative Ulster Protest-
antism. In the absence of a clear national consciousness, 
an identity formulated in terms of evangelical Protestantism 
is ultimately the only viable one for defending the cO'1tin-
ued social and cultural autonomy and dominance of Ulster 
loyalists, even for many working-class Protestants who 
have long since ceased to be religiously observant.26 
In effect, these researchers are saying that evangelical Protestantism 
is the only basis that supports the continued separation of Northern 
Ireland from the rest of the island. This quote also seems to support 
the idea that religion serves as the foundation of Unionist extremism. 
While religion is not the primary reason for Protestants' strident 
support of the link with Britain, it provides a basis for maintaining 
the siege mentality. Those who are not religiously active but share 
the same political garrisonism of their pious neighbors join with 
them in the face of the common threat of Cathol icism, embodied in 
the possibility that Northern Ireland might become part of the Irish 
Republic. While it is extremely simplistic to argue that fear of 
Catholicism as a religious entity is the primary motivation guiding 
Ulster unionists, it is equally important to not dismiss entirely the 
importance of religion as a political rallying point for the Protestant 
community. 
Similar to the previous description of the origins of Paisley's 
popularity, some attribute Paisley's success to the inherent 
garrisonism of many Ulster Protestants. Moloney and Pollak contend 
th at: 
The real key to Paisley's power is that he mirrors the 
insecurity that lurks deep within all Northern Ireland 
Unionists, the belief that everywhere there arc enemies 
conspiring against them. Paisley feeds that paranoia with 
one hand but with the other calms it with his own certainty.27 
That is, Paisley stirs up extremism, but his faith that unionism wi11 
trlu,mph in the end helps to reassure unionists who subscribe to this 
pin'nacle of garflsonlsm. These somewhat unsympathetic bio-
graphers go on to elaborate upon this point: 
One of Paisley's greatest strengths is his intimate 
knowledge of the peculiarly politico-religious 
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paranoia of Loyalism. He is as skillful as any fanatical 
Muslim leader in whipping it up in his people. And 
his methods are similar. 'He has brainwashed them 
into believing that protecting Ulster is a holy crusade', 
says one prominent ex-follower. 'They are fighting 
for God, and God's a Protestant and an Orangeman, 
as everyone knows, and so fie must want Ulster to stay 
as It IS. Anybody who says anything else is the enemy.'28 
It seems that they feel Paisley's activism to the possible point 
martyrdom is a major component of Protestant garrisonism, at Ie 
for the supporters of the DUP. This is what is usually implied wI 
one "fights for God". Such narrow views lie at the heart of Paisle 
support, and they are pcrpctuated by his unyielding commitment 
them. 
The religious aspccts of Paisley's politics are emphasized ml 
clearly by the sympathctic biographer Smyth. He draws comparis( 
between Paisley and the "politiciscd fundamentalists in the Uni1 
States", particularly in four areas. One, he observes that they b< 
share a patriotic idealism that borders upon chauvinism for th 
homeland; two, that there is an inhercnt di strust of government a 
particularly of the motives of mainstream politicians; three, there 
the perception that pcrsonal I ibcrtics are threatened by outsi 
forces, be it from communism or Irish nationalism(Paisley fe, 
both); and four, Paislcy's rigid dctcrmination to rcsist changes whi 
promote "liberalisation in moral attitudcs" is cxtremely similar to t 
campaIgns of such fundamentalist watchdogs as the Mor 
Majority.29 Part of Smyth's reasoning behind this claim 
undoubtedly the fact that Ian Paisley reccived his doctorate fro 
Bob Jones University in Greeneville, SC. lIe summarized Paisley 
political absorption of these qualities: 
This ideology has been shaped by Scottish seventeenth 
century Presbyterian political theory with its emphasis 
on a form of contractural .. ~n~gial1ce, and by twentieth 
century American Fundament al ist revival ism with its 
strong populist appeal and love of country. Paisley's 
particular talent has been to graft Ol1to the political 
principles of his covenanting forefathers all the energy, 
financial acumen, and brashness of the f-'undamentalist 
Protestant sects of the us.3 0 
It should be noted that this reference to the contractural theory c 
governmental relationships is identical to Miller's assertion i 
Queen's Rehels that a major reason for Ulster Protestant garrisonisr 
is that they sti" rely upon a contractural theory of politics [oriente, 
primarily between the regent and hi slher subjects 1 whi Ie main I ani 
Britain has movcd onto to a Parliament-dominatcd form 0 
government that makes the constitutional position of Northern 
Ireland inherently unstable) 1 
As a result of this fiery style of religio-political motivation that 
is readily observable in Paisley's background, the DUP responds by 
being one of the most vocal and activist groups in the province. One 
of the primary reasons for this is Paisley himself. As the founder 
and leader of Democratic Unionism, he is the natural initiator of his 
party's political actions. Since he believes so fervently in both 
individual responsibility and the necessity of individual activism in 
religious matters, and since he also frequently fuses religious and 
political issues, the OUP follows his lead and tends to participate in 
more vocal and noticeable forms of protest, such as the 
aforementioned "No Pope Here" demonstration outside of St. Anne's. 
Studies of the background of those who are presumably the most 
activist OUP members (the politicians themselves) have also shown a 
larger proportion of free Presbyterians than make up the OUP 
electorate. 32 Even those who are not members of the Free 
Presbyterian Church tend to be evangelical Christians from other 
denominations such as the Methodists and the Baptists. This tends to 
support the concept of Paisley's ultra-fundamentalist, ultra-activist 
theology being representative of the essence of Protestant 
garrisonism as well as upholding the validity of the contention that 
religious fundamentalism frequently gives rise to political 
garrisonism. 33 Bruce has noted this similarity of religious and 
political activism, as well as the phenomena of the non-religious 
voting for Protestant fundamentalists: 
. . .even non-evangelicals recognize that evangelicalism 
symbolizes the heart of their Unionism, and that political 
goals are best pursued by evangelicals) 4 
That is, since the theological fear of Catholicism is so strong, and the 
tradition of individual dedication and activism is so long, it seems 
evident that the religio-political activists of the OUP are the more 
inflexible of the two Unionist parties, and thus are the "safer bet" for 
the more garrisonistic voters that compose a considerable portion of 
the Ulster Protestant electorate. 
There seem to be three main conclusions that may be drawn 
about the way that Ian Paisley influences Protestant politics in 
Northern Ireland. One is his religious extremism; Paisley's theology 
is such that it directly affects the way political issues are debated in 
the province. lIe bel ieves the Pope to be the A ntichrist, and this 
makes Catholics either dupes in the hands of Satan or active soldiers 
in the army of the Antichrist. This obviously makes Paisley, and by 
association his followers, reluctant to compromise with the Roman 
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Catholic community. Two, despite the fact that Paisley himself is 
extreme within Unionism both theologically and politically, he enjoys 
widespread electoral support. This suggests that a considerable bulk 
of Ulster Protestant society is affected hy a sense of garrisonism, for 
even though they might feel Paisley to he more extreme in many 
ways than themselves, he is a "safe het" who can he counted upon to 
not allow the IRA to scare him or British politicians to sway him into 
supporting anything that might in any possible scenario lead to a 
united Ireland. Three, the group represented by Paisley, the DUP 
and the Free Presbyterian Church, are perhaps the most actIvIst 
groups involved in Northern Irish politics short of the paramilitaries. 
Their activism may be accurately perceived as a potent expression of 
fundamentalist religio-political behavior that is inherent 10 the 
heritage and theology of mainstream Ulster Presbyterianism. Thus, 
it can be said that Ian Paisley glaringly personifies the 
fundamentalism that serves as a basis for Ulster Protestant 
garrisonism. 
The example of Ian Paisley shows the vital link between 
religion and politics in the Ulster Protestant community, and shows 
how it is paradoxically both a unifying and a divisive factor. Even 
though he enjoys immense political popularity, there is hardly 
unanimity ahout his theological rhetoric or political tactics. In the 
next chapter I will discuss the ecumenical movement, which shows 
that there are those in the Ulster Protestant community, again 
distinguished primarily hy denomination, who feel the divisiveness 
of a leader like Paisley to he both outdated and unnecessarily 
inflammatory. 
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THE EClJMENICAL MOVEMENT IN IRELAND 
Much of this project has thus far focused upon the divisions 
and denominational distinctions between the most influential 
Protestant churches. We have examined the differences between the 
mainstream Presbyterian churches and the Church of Ireland, and 
have just concluded a study of perhaps the most religiously and 
politically divisive figure in Northern Irish politics, the Reverend Ian 
Paisley. The frictions between the more fundamentalist elements 
contained primarily within the Presbyterian churches and the more 
theologically liberal members of the Church of Ireland arise from a 
number of factors we have already examined. The history of 
Anglican advantage and present apparent social influence combined 
with their critical approach to scriptural interpretation make the 
more fundamentalist, historically rugged and uncompromlsmg 
Presbyterians fearful that the Anglicans are liable to seek some sort 
of political and religious compromise with the Roman Catholic 
community. These compromises are not simply politically 
undesirable to many Presbyterians. They represent a palpable threat 
to the Presbyterian style of worship, they seem inherently immoral 
to the more ex t reme. 
It is this fear of compromise that brings us to the next part of 
this study. Here we will examine the divisions within the Ulster 
Protestant community that have arIsen because of the greatest 
theological compromise to be seriously considered smce the 
Reformation: the ecumenical movement. Again, these differences 
tend to be ones of degree. All the Protestant churches in Northern 
Ireland are a bit leery of ecumenical union with the Roman Catholic 
church. However, the differences between the Protestant 
denominations that manifest themselves in both religion and politics 
show themselves clearly in the varied denominational responses to 
the ecumenical movement. The Anglican Church of Ireland is the 
major church in the province that supports the ecumenical trend, 
while the Presbyterian church seems primarily opposed to even 
considering such a un i on. Of course, Pai sley's free Presbyterian 
Church is decidedly and actively opposes the ecumenical movement 
in any form. 
Before pursuing a more detailed discussion of the evidence 
supporting this claim, it would first be appropriate to examine the 
wider ecumenical movement, and then proceed to a close-up of the 
movement in Northern Ireland. The ecumenical movement arose 
from Pope John XXIII's calIing of the Second Vatican Council in the 
mid-1960s, more commonly known as Vatican II, which sought to 
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re-ev al uate Roman Cathol ic doc tri nes and teac hi ngs. While 
important for such internal changes as relaxing some of the stricter 
papal doctrines, the main thrust of these reforms seemed to be an 
attempt to bring centuries of Christian separation and discord to a 
close. As one Ulster ecumenist has written: 
Vatican II brought to an end the 'icy wind' of 
Pius IX's Syllabus ErrorlIIn and Pius Xl's Encyclical 
Mortalium Animos 1928 ... with Vatican II the door 
of hope for beller understanding and reconciliation 
opened. 1 
By relaxing the Papacy's theological stance towards other 
churches, Vatican II began to take steps to achieve the Christian 
unity summed up in the Nicene Creed's vision of "one holy, catholic, 
and apostolic church. "2 Indeed, a number of encouraging precedents 
existed for the pursuance of such a vision. For example, the World 
Council of Churches had been formed in 1948 from organizations 
representing four mi II ion Christians who: 
... confess the Lord Jesus as God alld saviour according 
to the Scriptures and therefore seek to rulrill together 
their cOllllllon calling to thc glory or OIlC Clod, father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit) 
Such cooperation was encouraging to those Christians who were 
distressed by the apparent contradiction hetween a messiah who had 
said "AlI those who calion my name shall be saved" and the 
existence of thousands of separate churches, each of whom called 
upon Christ's name but who also often felt that their particular brand 
of Christianity was the only 'true' way to be saved. Though the 
dream of uniting all the Christian churches has a history that dates 
back to the Reformation writings of Martin Luther and John Calvin, 
the opposition of the Roman Catholic church had previously been an 
insurmountable barrier. 4 However, the Second Vatican Council 
changed this state of affairs quite dramatically, and it opened the 
door to further inter-Christian- ~dialogue and ecclesiastical 
cooperati on. 
By receIvIng this Papal blessing, the latent ecumenical 
movement, which before Vatican II consisted primarily of informal, 
personal meetings between various church officials, began to expand. 
It was, and continues to be, generally directed towards uniting the 
three main branches of Christianity, namely the western Protestant 
churches, the Roman Catholic church, and the Eastern Orthodox 
churches. 5 Soon after the Second Vatican Council there began to be 
conspicuous official interaction between these three branches. For 
example, in 1966 the Anglican Archbishop of Canterhury flew to 
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Rome to meet with Pope Paul VI in order to establish meaningful 
communication between the two churches.6 
In Ireland, there was an initially encouraging acceptance of 
these ecumenical developments. Indeed, tentative gestures with 
decided ecumenical overtones had been begun in 1964, which 
predated the enactment of the Second Vatican Council. A Church of 
Ireland abbot [note his denominationl founded the Glenstal 
Ecumenical Conference, which was made up of individuals from the 
various churches who met for "full, free, frank discussion" where "no 
findings are drawn up. The aim is [personall enlightenment. .. "7 
Though this might sound quite cautious to outside observers, in 
Ireland it was seen as a significant development by many members 
of both the Protestant and Catholic communities. The primary 
disagreement within these groups was whether these steps were to 
be supported or opposed. Two years later the Greenhills Ecumenical 
Conference was established. lIeld during the annual Week of Prayer 
for Christian Unity, this was a one-clay meeting of individuals 
regardless of their Christian denomination. Both of these were 
unofficial ecumenical gatherings; that is, they were not expressly 
called for by the leaderships of the various churches. However, it 
seems that the connections made at these various gatherings set the 
stage for the official ecumenical meetings held at Ballymascanlon 
beginning in 1973. H These talks were attempts to clarify the 
theological differences existing between the various main churches in 
Ireland, and their product was a series of reports that detailed both 
agreements and points of contention concerning topics such as 
baptism, the Eucharist, and marriage, as well as more abstract 
subjects like the relationship between the church, scripture, and the 
source of ecclesiastical authority. The talks, while perhaps leading to 
greater understanding amongst the various church leaderships, seem 
to have stopped at th is point. Fo~ ex~mple, one commentator has had 
this criticism of the Ballymascanlon meetings: 
The weakness of these talks is that no procedure 
has heen laid down for the implementing of its 
findings, or effective provision made for bringing 
the results of its work to the allention of the Churches, 
especially the laity.9 
In evaluating the ecumenical movement in Ireland as a whole, 
then, it seems that it has enjoyed only modest success and has had 
little results beyond establishing the fact that some members from 
the various church administrations are on friendly terms with one 
another. When one confines his ecumenical examination to the 
borders of Northern Ireland, it becomes painfully obvious that 
overall, the ecumenical movement has, as one observer understated 
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the case, "made only disappointing headway".1 0 Quite simply, this 
seems due to the enormous obstacles presented by both the present 
conflict in the province and the socio-political factors such as Ulster 
Protestant garrison ism that contribute to the intractability of the 
situation. 
Many of these barriers are those that have been mentioned at 
various points throughout this paper. The Protestant and Catholic 
communities are virtually segregated from one another. They go to 
different schools, they live in different neighborhoods, they 
partICIpate either in different athletic games or in different leagues 
of the same sports. Thus, because they simply do not know each 
other, ecumenism is even more difficult than in areas suc':1 as the 
United States or on the European continent where Catholics and 
Protestants tend to mix freely. The conflict of the last twenty years 
has further emphasized the differences between Catholic and 
Protestant, and this means the ecumenical movement seems 
extremely strange to residents of a province where a religious 
dividing line between two conflicting comlllunities has been etched 
in stone for centuries. Perhaps the greatest barrier on all sides to the 
ecumenical movement is the fact that reI igious loyalties usually 
predispose a particular political orientation. In this light, ecumenism 
becomes illogical to the more extreme: hy destroying the differences 
between the Protestants and Catholics, one would either be accepting 
the link with Britain or facilitating the absorption of Ulster in the 
Irish Republic. Here the fear of religious compromise leading to 
political betrayal is at its strongest. Because "Protestant" and 
"Catholic" are terms having numerous political implications in any 
Northern Irish context, attempts to join the two together IS seen as 
not simply a religious or ecclesiastical matter. As one author has 
stated, "Ecumenism in Northern Ireland is not just about the 
Churches and their creeds and~<?.r§.hip;" it would touch virtually 
every facet of their lives.!! The perceived political implications of 
ecumenism have been specifically noted by one researcher: 
. . .on the Protestant side, enough people arc 
persuaded that ecumenism undermines the pol-
itical union with Great Britain, by minimizing 
the difference between Irish Catholics and Irish 
Protestants, to make the further outreach or popu-
larisation of ecumenism a ncar-impossibility. J 2 
As I have consistently argued throughout the course of this project, 
generalizing about the Northern Irish Protestants does not tell the 
whole story about their political situation, and this statement, though 
useful as a starting point, does not reveal much about the divisions 
within the Ulster Protestant community. The Protestant 
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denominations in Northern Ireland have responded in varying ways 
to the ecumenical movement. Predictably, the Church of Ireland has 
responded the most favorably to ecumenism of all the Protestant 
den 0 min a t ion s. 13 On the other hand, the Presbyterians have 
generally been either reluctant or openly opposed to ecumenical 
overtures. Paisley's free Presbyterian Church is diametrically and 
vociferously opposed to any form of ecumenism which entails an 
acceptance of the Roman Catholic Church. Before elaborating upon 
their positions, it is first necessary to examine the theological 
premises of the overall ecumenical movement, for only then does the 
reasoning behind each church's stance become clear. 
It is quite difficult to find one coherent view about what the 
ecumenical movement actually entails or what its exact final 
objective might be. Church leaders' views of ecumenism seem rather 
similar to the ways different European leaders view the European 
Economic Community. Some are quite vIsIOnary, and see the 
movement as a means to bring about unity in administration and 
policy. Thus, just as some people envision a single, clear European 
voice, some hope that a single Christian organization might result 
from the culmination of the ecumenical movement. 14 Opposed to 
these conceptions are those people who are reluctant to participate in 
the movement at all. Though their reasons vary, these conservatives 
are agreed that if any change should occur at all, it must be modest 
and extremely gradual. The majority of people, hoth with regards to 
the EEC and the ecumenical movement, however, seem to fall 
somewhere in between these two poles. Theirs is a rather vague 
commitment to finding the best mix of unity and independence: the 
fabled "golden mean". However, regardless of the degree of support, 
there seems to be a theological view common to those supporting 
ecumenical developments. This VIew is grounded in a theological 
method that has heen described b,y ___ ~n ecumenist from the Lutheran 
tradition: 
(I propose) an explanation of ecumenism by the description 
of a theological method that is characterized by the following; 
1. The recognition of the ambiguity of all theological state-
ments because of the inadequacy of human language to 
comprehend the transcendent. 
2. The acknowledgement of the need to find new language 
and concepts to express Christian belief. 
3. The acceptance of a view of relative emphasis that certain 
doctrines from the past may no longer be as crucial to the 
essentials 01" the Christian message. 
4. The approval of legitimate diversity in the interpretation 
of doctrine so that the same mystery 01" faith can be differently 
expressed. 
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5. The willingness to hear the Gospel afresh and clarify or 
modify denominational traditions in view of that gospel. 1 5 
It should be fairly clear that these characteristics describe a 
liberal view of scripture. The first point elaborated is clearly non-
fundamentalist; indeed, accepting that all theological statements are 
ambiguous is in direct opposition to the view that the Bible is "totally 
inerrant", wh ic his a pri mary characteri stic of fundamentalism. 
Likewise, the second point is not of fundamentalist origin, for the 
fundamentalist has no "need" for "new language" in Christianity; the 
authors of the New Testament provided all the wri tings needed for 
the Christian faith. Again, the third point refuting the need to 
emphasize past doctrines diametrically opposes the Christian 
fundamentalist ideal of "back to the Bible"; Paisley's adherence to 
Reformation concepts of the Pope as the Antichrist is a powerful 
example of this from a Northern Irish context. The fourth point 
elaborated IS fairly ambiguous and thus does not directly or 
powerfully present an opposItIOn to fundamentalism, although the 
tendency of Christian fundamentalist denominations to see 
themselves as the exclusive "elect" (to borrow a term from Calvin) 
seems to deny any concept of "legitimate diversity." Pinally, the last 
el aborated characteristic's "wi II i ngness to hear the Gospel afresh" is 
in opposition to fundamentalism, for Christian fundamentalists 
believe the texts of the Gospels to have the same meaning today as 
they did when Christ's Apostles transcribed them. Thus, if we 
adhere to Schmidt's definition of a Christian liberal as elaborated in 
chapter 3, pages 30-], then it is cle'l.f that the ecumenical movement 
may be classed as a product of liberal Christian theology. 
Recognizing this reveals the barriers to accepting ecumenism 
for those with more fundamentali')t theological views. The 
ecumenical movement is based on a view of scripture that depends 
upon critical analysis that does not' immediately assume it to be 
directly transmitted from God to the re~der-it emphasizes that the 
author must be also considered. As a result, fundamentalists, with 
their literalistic interpretation of the Holy Bible's message, seem 
excluded from participation in this movement almost by definition. 
Ecumenism, in its more extreme forms, seeks to basically "overhaul" 
Christianity by eventually doing away with denominational 
distinctions altogether, or at least to reduce differences between the 
denominations through compromise about contentious theological 
Issues. This in turn would blur the very real, if stylistic, distinctions 
represented by the names of th'e' varying chnominations. To 
fundamentalists who agree with the uncomproll}ising stubbornness 
" II, 
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of their particular denomination's founder(s), who broke with the 
main body of the church in days past rather than accept such 
compromises on any number of issues, the ecumenical movement 
represents not "socialism coming in through the back door" through 
the unification of Europe feared by political leaders like Thatcher, 
but rather is seen by many fundamentalists as Satan coming in 
through the back door via ecumenism, for the movement is grounded 
in an alternative perception of the Christian faith. It is not that 
Christian unity does not seem a worthy goal to these people, but that 
unity is not worth the risk to the soul entailed by compromising on 
matters of doctrine that have for many congregations been extolled 
as the reason they have the "truth" and not some other group. With 
these implications in mind, it should only require a brief survey of 
the various Protestant churches for their posi tions on the matter of 
ecumenism to be uncIerstandable. 
As has been previously mentioned, the Church of Ireland has 
been more favorable to ecumenism than other Protestant 
denominations in the province. This is substantially attributable to 
the close relations with the Church of England, which has taken a 
leacIing role in advancing the ecumenical movement. In the early 
1980s, for example, the Church of England participated in a series of 
discussions with the Roman Catholic church that produced a joint 
report, which the Times of London described as placing the Anglican 
body on a "convergent course with the Roman Catholic church."l6 
Nor should it be assumed that the Church of Ireland was dragged 
reluctantly into its support of the ecumenical movement, for 
Anglicanism in general has been a major moving force in ecumenism. 
As one author has written: 
Any history of the church in the twentieth century 
makes clear the commitment of Anglicans to the ecumen-
ical movement. Anglican churches and their members 
have played key roles in-- -international. nat ional, and 
regional ecumenical efforts throughout this century.l7 
This support for the ecumenical movement should not be surprising, 
particularly given the fact that the liberal Christian theology which is 
the basis of the ecumenical movement is shared by a considerable 
number of Anglicans, as was argued in the third chapter. 
Nor should it be surprising that Paisley's Free Presbyterian 
church actively opposes the ecumenical movement. His fiery 
fundamentalism expressly denounces Ii beral Chri sti an theology, and 
his views of the Roman Catholic church hardly lend themselves to 
ecumenism. A sampling of his views should suffice to establish this 
poi n t: 
. . .today the leaders of the now apostate rcl"ormed(Protestant) 
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churches arc tripping over one another to slabber on the 
Pope's slippers. The World Council of Churches (WCC) has 
become the vestibule of the Vatican. 1 8 
If the ecumenical WCC is the "vestibule of the Vatican", then in 
Paisley's theology it is the domain of the Antichrist. Paisley does not 
confine his CTltIcIsm of the ecumenical movement to vague 
denunciations. lIe expressly condemns the Church of Ireland for its 
role in expanding the movement: 
For years I have been warning that the ecumenical churches 
were simply going down the Roman road. The ecumenists 
have vehemently denied this. Now the real truth is surfacing. 
The Anglicans arc now prepared to acknowledge the Pope as 
the Head of the Universal Church and to yield submission to 
him even though the official teaching of Rome is that they 
arc a bunch of imposters ... The Church of Ireland is deeply 
involved in this betrayal of our Reformation heritage because 
the Joint Anglican Chairman of the Anglican-Roman Catholic 
Commission is no less than Dr. McAdoo, the Church of Ireland 
Archbishop of Dublin, (and) the Primate of Ireland. 19 
In this quote lies much of what we have been discussing throughout 
this project. Protestant garrisonism is exhibited quite strongly: even 
discussing compromise with the Roman Catholic church about 
religious matters is "going down the Roman road," which implies a 
complete "sell-out" to the other side-also note that any concessions 
that may have been made by the Vatican were not mentioned. Also, 
fundamentalist religion is a primary source of this garrisonism, and it 
is directed not only at the Roman Catholic church, but at the fellow 
Ulster Protestants in the Church of Ireland who do not share these 
fundamentalist views to such an extent. In this way, the Free 
Presbyterian view of the ecumenical movement brings the often 
elusive conflict between Presbyterian and Anglican into sharper 
focus. As was mentioned in the chapter about Ian Paisley, it is 
possible to extrapolate some views of the mainstream Irish 
Presbyterian churches from thoseof·the Free Presbyterian church. 20 
As one author has written: 
. . .Northern Ireland's mainstream Presbyterianism 
differed from the fundamentalist evangelical Presby-
terianism typified by Ian Paisley only in fervour and 
intensity of belier.21 
Though the Presbyterians are hardly as vocal as the Reverend 
Paisley upon the matter of ecumenism, they have been reI uctant to 
partIcIpate in the movement, particularly when compared to the 
Anglicans. For example, they withdrew from the World Council of 
Churches when that ecumenical body expressed support for South 
African liheration movements. 22 Despite the existence of liberal 
Presbyterians who feel ecumenlsm a proper way to progress, it 
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seems that the bulk of the Presbyterian laity are extremely reluctant 
to join the ecumenical movement. One observer has justified this 
contention by commenting upon the organizational structure of the 
churches. Noting that in the Anglican church, the hierarchy has a 
considerable amount of power regarding the direction taken by the 
church, the more democratic (in the literal sense of 'government by 
the people') organization of the Presbyterian church could not move 
towards ecumenism without the consent of the laity, and this consent 
simply does not exist within the ranks of the Presbyterian church. 
Loughlin has written that: 
lL is only in the last twenty years or so with the widespread 
destruction and death caused hy the Troubles that the Church 
leaderships have been jolted out of these 'frozen' theologies. 
Contacts of an ecumenical and theological nature have been 
developed, and the leaders of the main Churches have often 
spoken together on various issues, while (still) retaining 
their basic political orientations. This has been easier for 
the Catholics and the Anglicans ... whose leaderships are 
'freer' institutionally from their flocks. The Presbyterians, 
on the other hand, are more under the control of the 
grass-roots. 23 
The basic fundamentalism of the Presbyterian faith combined with 
the political barriers to ecumenism make the ecumenical movement 
seem to be another form of compromise with the Catholics, and thus 
something which would ultimately weaken the position of Ulster 
Protestants as part of the United Kingdom. The behavior of the 
Church of Ireland seems to more extreme Presbyterians a form of 
religious "Lundyism", a sell-out of the entire "garrison" of Ulster 
Protestants to the Roman Catholics. It is in this light that the 
ecumenical movement should be viewed in relation to Northern Irish 
Protestant religion and politics. It is a form of compromise that 
highlights the various positions of the denominations within the 
Protestant religious and political cO.m!TIunity. 
In summation, we find that the Anglicans are arrayed closest to 
ecumenical compromise. Their overtures to the Roman Catholic 
church on a religious level, the church's history of discrimination 
against the Dissenters, and their long-time economic dominance 
make them a likely target of Presbyterian animosity. On the other 
side of the ecumenical fence are the Presbyterians, the largest 
Protestant denomination tn Northern Ireland. They are more 
garrisonistic in their behavior towards the Roman Catholic 
community than the Anglicans, and thus are wary of the Church of 
IreJand's motives in promoting any form of unity with the Roman 
Catholic church. This in turn causes the Presbyterians to question 
the political resolve of individual Anglicans to not yield to the 
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Catholic community on the all-importan L issue of Northern Ireland's 
constitutional link with Britain. Feedillg these fears is the tall and 
vocal figure of Ian Paisley, a theological leader with a massive 
political following in the province. By examining the ecumenical 
movement, one can see this disposition of religious forces most 
clearly, and it dramatically rerresents what I see to be the 
topography of Protestant politics in Northern Ireland. 
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CONCLIJSJONS 
Throughout the course of this study I have tried to emphasize 
three major points about the political role of Ulster Protestant 
religious organizations. One is that the Ulster Protestants are a 
diverse political coalition, and thus are not the monolithic group they 
are so often portrayed to be. Another is that the differences that 
divide them can be observed to fall broadly along denominational 
lines, primarily between the Presbyterians and the Church of 
Ireland. These differences manifest themselves theologically, 
historically, and, to a lesser degree, economically and demograph-
ically. Almost paradoxically, however, these groups also share 
characteristics that unite them in OppOS1tIOn to other, more 
dangerous threats, such as submersion in an overwhelmingly Catholic 
Ireland, or the fear of a "sell-out" ongmating at Westminster. 
Unfortunately, in many studies of the province, these very real 
cleavages within the Ulster Protestant community have been either 
glossed over or ignored. They exist, and the primary aim of this 
study has been to bring them to light. 
Finally, these denominational differences, which seem to arise 
primarily from a fundamentalist/liberal theological conflict, increase 
the political and social garrisonism exhibited by the Ulster 
Protestants. Traceable to the days of the Plantation of the 
seventeenth century, this tendency of the Ulster Protestant 
community to assume a combative, defensive posture in times of 
crisis has been modified to include such more recent "attacks" as the 
Irish lIome Rule movement, which the overwhelming majority of 
Ulster Protestants opposed for a variety of economic and religious 
reasons, and the more direct threat posed by Irish republicanism, 
most dramatically represented by the Provisional IRA. The fact of 
divisions within the Protestant _~9mmunity makes this defensive 
posture appear and perhaps become unstable in the face of these 
"threats" leads those on the Unionist extremes to become even more 
garrisonistic in their attitudes and behavior. 
The paragon of Protestant extremism in Northern Ireland is the 
Reverend Ian Paisley. By combining the tradition of Ulster 
Protestant garri sonism (both reI igious and pol it ical) wi th the fervor 
and vigor of A merican reI igious fundamental ism, Paisley gives a new 
expression to old fears of the Protestant population of the province of 
Northern Ireland, and this expreSSIOn heightens Protestant 
garrisonism and blocks the way towards any consensual resolution of 
the troubles that plague Ulster. His Free Presbyterianism seems a 
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concentration of those features in mainstream Presbyterianism that 
divide it from the more liberal Church of Ireland. 
The different attitudes of the churches towards the ecumenical 
movement presents these differences between Protestant religious 
bodies, and additionally supports the argument that their theological 
differences arise from a fundamentalist/liberal split. The Church of 
Ireland is the most supportive of this movement, though political 
considerations make it less progressive than its English counterpart. 
Diametrically opposed to any union with the Roman Catholic church 
is the Reverend Paisley, who believes the Pope to be the Antichrist. 
In the middle, though still extremely reluctant to even discuss 
ecumenical union with the Church of Rome, are the mainstI earn Irish 
Presbyterians. 
In conclusion, religion seems to play a Janus-faced role in 
Ulster Protestant politics. On one hand it is a cohesive cultural factor. 
Being a Northern Irish Protestant implies a shared history and 
theology that binds virtually the entire Ulster Protestant population 
behind an uncompromising political rhetoric and activism directed 
against both Irish Republicans and British politicians. On the other 
hand, it also is a source of dissent within this community. The 
varying degrees of opposition to the Catholic church and attitudes 
towards scriptural interpretation m,lke the more fundamentalist and 
uncompromising within Unionist ranks fearful that the resolve of 
those who would accommodate the Roman Catholic population is not 
strong enough to ensure the survival of Northern Ireland as a 
political entity. Because of their heightened garrisonism, they see 
any form of compromise as a form of "Lundyism," an act of betrayal 
against the entire Unionist population, and oppose it to the fuIl of 
their strength. It is this intransigence of a significant proportion of 
Ulster Unionists which is a major contributing factor to the enduring 
nature of the "Troubles." Unfortun,Hely, the reasons for its existence 
are factors that arc not readily changed or forgotten, and its 
continuation seems assured. 
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uses steam curing 
procedures to quickly produce structural members. The rate 
of temperature rise in the steam chamber is critical to the 
steam curing process. This investigation examines the effect 
of varying rates of rise on the compressive strength of the 
concrete. 
A 6000 psi mix design was used to test three separate 
rates of temperature rise. The specimens were fabricated in 
standard 6 x 12 in. molds, and each batch was tested at 2~ 
hours, 3 days, and 28 days. 
The control <moist cured) specimens, the ~OoF/hr rise 
specimens, and the 50 0 F/hr rise specimens had comparable 
strengths at all ages. Similar early age strengths for all 
rise rates cause the batches to appear equal initially. 
However, the 60 0 F/hr rise specimens showed a considerably 
lower 28-day strength than the moist specimens. Higher 
rates of temperature rise were found to be detrimental to 
the development of 28 day compressive strength values. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent growth in the use of precast, prestressed 
concrete members throughout the construction industry has 
placed a tremendous demand on production facilities. To meet 
this demand, the prestressing plants are forced to expedite 
the curing of concrete and mass produce the members. Steam 
curing has become a popular method of accelerating the gain 
of compressive strength in precast concrete members. This 
process minimizes plant cycle time and maximizes output by 
reducing the time that the concrete must remain in the 
forms. 
A typical plant cycle includes casting, initial set, 
steam curing, stripping the forms, and cleaning the forms 
(Hanson, 1963). The concrete is first placed in reusable 
forms and then allowed to begin its initial set. A few hours 
later, the members are subjected to steam at atmospheric 
pressure for a specified length of time. When the concrete 
develops sufficient strength, the forms are removed and 
cleaned. 
3 
A critical factor in the success of the steam curing 
procedure is the rate at which the temperature in the curing 
chamber is increased from room temperature to a specified 
maximum temperature. This study examines the relationship 
between three practical rates of rise (~OO F/hr, 50° F/hr, 
and 60° F/hr) and the compressive strengths of the concrete. 
.. __ .__ ..... _-----------------------------------------
2. EXPERIMENT PROCEDURE 
The experiment procedure consisted of fabricating the 
specimens, curing the specimens, and testing the specimens. 
2-..LF-2.bl;.'.iC3itioIl._ Q f Spe cim.~ns 
Three batches were cast to test the three separate 
rates of rise. All batches were laboratory mixes prepared in 
a 7.5 ft 3 mixer. The test specimens were fabricated using a 
mix designed to produce an approximate 28-day strength of 
6000 psi. Standard 6 x 12 in. molds were used in compliance 
with ASTM C470, and the specimens were molded by methods 
described in ASTM C31. The coarse aggregate used was ASTM 
Number 67, and the fine aggregate was crushed limestone. The 
mix design for one c.y. is as follows: 







z 292 lb. (Oluokum, 
1990). The water content varied ±1% because the slump for 
each batch was held constant at 2-3/4 inches. 
~C~n&-of Specimens 
Each batch consisted of six moist and six steam-cured 
specimens. The twelve cylinders for each batch were cast at 
the same time and allowed an initial set period of five 
hours. Next, six of the specimens were placed in the steam 
chamber. The temperature was increased at a particular rate 
to the maximum temperature of 160 of in the steam chamber 
(See Figure 1). Each batch of concrete remained in the steam 
----------------------"-
chamber for a total of 16 hours. The three different rise 
rates are demonstrated in Figure 2. 
After the total curing time had elapsed, the specimens 
were removed. At the age of 2~ hours, the samples were 
stripped and placed in the moist room where curing continued 
at 73°F in compliance with ASTM C192. 
_2. 3 Te~j:.ing Q_f __ ~.E5L<;!irrlens 
Four specimens from each batch, two steam cured and two 
moist cured, were tested for compressive strength values at 
the ages of 2~ hours, 3 days, and 28 days. Prior to testing, 
the specimens were capped with a sulfur compound (ASTM 
C617). The tests were conducted in uniaxial compression 
until failure. A total of 36 cylinders were tested. 
3. TEST RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
From the basic test data (Table 1), average values were 
obtained representing each data point (Table 2). The moist-
5 
cure values represent the overall averages of the moist 
cured specimens. 
The first graphic data display (Figure 3 ) shows the 
average strength values for each data point (psi) versus age 
of the concrete (days) . In this graphic, the values used to 
represent the moist cure samples are the averages of all 
three batches. As expected, the strengths of the moist-cured 
specimens are significantly lower than the strengths of the 
steam-cured specimens at early ages. Thus, steam curing is 
needed to develop the compressive strength required to 
remove the forms promptly without damaging the concrete. 
However, the actual strength of the steam-cured concrete may 
be shadowed by the early strength. The three groups of 
steam-cured specimens representing the different rates of 
rise have essentially the same strength at early ages 
(Figure 3). This property may be desirable to precast plant 
operators, but the similar early strengths may actually give 
the impression that the three batches have equal strengths 
regardless of the rise rate. Thus, the similar early 
strengths impair quality control because the various rise 
rate conditions are undetectable at early ages. 
6 
The compressive strengths of the batches at 28 days are 
not as comparable as the early age strengths (Figure 3). The 
~OoF rise and 50 0 F rise batches have practically the same 
strength, and all are above the design strength of 6000 psi. 
However, the compressive strength of the 60°F rise rate at 
28 days is below the design strength of 6000 psi. This 
noticeable decrease is perhaps caused by the formation of 
microcracks in the concrete when it is subjected to higher 
rise rates in the steam chamber. 
Plotting the strengths (psi) versus the rise rates with 
three data points on one vertical line representing one 
batch vividly reveals the degradation of the 28-day strength 





strengths of all steam-cured specimens are 
same. On the other hand, the 28-day curve 
degradation over time in the development of 
capacity. Although the moist, ~OoF rise, 
7 
and 50° rise values are consistent, the 60°F rise value is 
considerably lower and is below the design strength of 6000 
psi. 
Ij.. CONCLUSIONS 
The results discussed in the preceding section ,show 
that high rise rates of temperature in the steam curing 
chamber may cause microcracking in the concrete. This 
phenomenon noticeably reduces the rate of development of 
ultimate strength in steam cured concrete members. For the 
rate of 
below 
rise of 60 0 F/hr, the 28-day compressive strength is 
the 6000 psi design strength. 
Furthermore, the effect of the high rise rates does not 
become evident until the concrete has aged. For many precast 
members, this flaw may not be easily detected. In order to 
avoid this situation, plant operators must give more 
attention to controlling the rate of temperature rise in the 
steam chamber. The rise must be closely monitored to produce 
precast members that possess the necessary design strength. 
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BASIC TEST DATA 
40 F /HR RISE 
24 HR 3 DAY 28 DAY 
Moist 1. 2740 psi 1. 4860 psi 1. 6650 psi 
2. 2600 psi 2. 4930 psi 2. 6930 psi 
Steam 1. 5840 psi 1. 5870 psi 1. 6580 psi 
2. 5270 psi 2. 5570 psi 2. 6930 psi 
50 F /HR RISE 
24 HR 3 DAY 28 DAY 
Moist 1. 3150 psi 1. 4490 
. 1. 6500 psi pSI 
2. 3060 psi 2. 4704 . 2. 6260 psi pSI 
Steam 1. 5550 psi 1. 5730 psi 1. 6190 psi 
2. 5290 psi 2. 5750 psi 2. 6680 psi 
60 F /HR RISE 
24 HR 3 DAY 28 DAY 
Moist 1. 3130 psi 1. 4810 psi 1. 6330 psi 
2. 3160 psi 2. 5000 psi 2. 6580 psi 
Steam 1. 5290 psi 1. 5660 psi 1. 6010 psi 
2. 5590 psi 2. 5480 
. 2. 5730 . pSI pSI 
TABLE 2: 
AVERAGE TEST DATA 
40 F /HR RISE 
24 HR 3 DAY 28 DAY 
Moist 1. 2670 psi 1. 4900 psi 1. 6790 psi 
Steam 1. 5550 psi 1. 5720 psi 1. 6750 psi 
50 F!HR RISE 
24 HR 3 DAY 28 DAY 
Moist 1. 3100 psi 1. 4600 psi 1. 6380 psi 
Steam 1. 5420 psi 1. 5740 psi 1. 6440 psi 
60 F!HR RISE 
24 HR 3 DAY 28 DAY 
Moist 1. 3150 . 1. 4910 psi 1. 6450 psi pSI 
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